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“[W]e continue to believe that our primary function in statutory
interpretation is effectuating the legislature’s intent, but we recognize
1
that that is often a difficult assignment.”
- The Honorable Virginia A. Long, Associate Justice, Supreme Court
of New Jersey (1999-Present)
“Do not expect anybody’s theory of statutory interpretation, whether
it is your own or somebody else’s, to be an accurate statement of
what courts actually do with statutes. The hard truth of the matter is
that American courts have no intelligible, generally accepted, and
2
consistently applied theory of statutory interpretation.”
- Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, Law Professors, Harvard
Law School
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INTRODUCTION
In the lead-up to the hotly contested 2009 governor’s race in New
Jersey, both sides tried to rally their supporters by mentioning the
3
coming Supreme Court vacancies. Under the New Jersey Constitution,
the governor has the power to “nominate and appoint, with the advice
and consent of the Senate, the Chief Justice and associate justices of the
4
Supreme Court . . . .” Once confirmed, justices “shall hold their offices
for initial terms of 7 years and upon reappointment shall hold their
offices during good behavior . . . [but] shall be retired upon attaining the
5
age of 70 years.” As a result of the multi-faceted judicial appointment
system, the newly-elected governor would have the opportunity to fill
four openings on the seven-member court, which has hardly been a
passive actor in state government. “For decades, the court, which has
the final word on interpreting state law and the New Jersey
6
Constitution, has been a driving force in New Jersey.” Both major
candidates offered the requisite platitudes associated with their
respective parties. Republican nominee Chris Christie, however, was
particularly outspoken in his denunciation of the “activist” court.
Critical of all the sitting justices, including the Republicans, Christie
3

All references to the “Supreme Court” or to the “court” refer to the New Jersey
Supreme Court. The United States Supreme Court is only referenced in full.
4
N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
5
Id.
6
Mary Fuchs, Next Governor Will Reshape N.J. Supreme Court, STAR LEDGER
(Newark, N.J.), Oct. 29, 2009, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2009/10/next_nj_
governor_could_impact.html.
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said that none of the justices embodied the type of jurist he would
appoint. Describing his ideal nominee, Christie said: “I want someone
who is extraordinarily bright, and I want someone who will interpret the
7
laws and the Constitution, not legislate from the bench.” Thencandidate, and now Governor, Christie was referring to an appointment
8
in the vein of United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia.
Scalia, who along with his colleague Justice Clarence Thomas is a
constitutional originalist, is perhaps most famous for his outspoken
textualism. Textualism, as a method of statutory interpretation,
proclaims: “The text is the law, and it is the text that must be
9
observed.” Grounded in the theory that the courts are the faithful agents
of the legislature, textualism frowns upon the use of legislative history
10
and rejects the notion that there is a discernable legislative “intent.”
In this Article, I demonstrate that in the complex arena of statutory
interpretation, the situation is not nearly as black and white as Christie
claims. The Governor may rightfully criticize the court’s constitutional
11
jurisprudence for producing purpose-driven, “activist” decisions.
However, the court in the past ten years, especially under Chief Justice
Stuart Rabner, has in fact employed a quasi-textualist approach to
statutory interpretation. The justices may not adhere to Scalia-like
12
textualism — especially since legislative “intent” continues to drive
7

Id.; see also Robert P. George, In Replacing Supreme Court Justice John Wallace, NJ
Gov. Chris Christie Made Good on His Promise, STAR LEDGER (May 9, 2010, 6:14 AM),
http://blog.nj.com/njv_guest_blog/2010/05/in_replacing_supreme_court_jus.html (quoting
candidate Christie as saying, “I will remake the court and I will remake it on this one simple
principle. If you (want to) legislate, (then) run for the Legislature, don’t put on a black robe
and go to the Supreme Court . . . (T)here won’t be any justices that I either reappoint or put
on that court that do that.”).
8
Republican Chris Christie defeated Democratic incumbent Jon Corzine to capture the
governor’s mansion on November 3, 2009. See David M. Halbfinger & Ian Urbina,
Republicans Bask in Glow of Victories in N.J. and Va., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/05/nyregion/05elect.html?_r=1.
9
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 22
(Amy Gutmann, ed., 1997).
10
See id. at 31 (“As I have said, I object to the use of legislative history on principle,
since I reject intent of the legislature as the proper criterion of the law.”).
11
I do not attempt to address whether or not I agree with the popular critiques of the
court’s constitutional jurisprudence, but I accept the fact that the court has such a reputation
for Constitutional “innovation.”
12
Yet even Scalia’s rigid textualism includes an exception for absurdities. See
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia,
J., concurring in judgment) (reaffirming “the venerable principle that if the language of a
statute is clear, that language must be given effect — at least in the absence of a patent
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the court’s statutory decisions, which are filled with references to
legislative history — but neither are they flagrantly disregarding the
text. The court’s general reputation for policy-driven activism and
13
innovation is just not as applicable to its statutory jurisprudence.
In my study of the court, I compared the final six years of the
Poritz Court to the first three years of the Rabner Court, disregarding
the cases decided during the brief tenure of Chief Justice James R.
14
Zazzali. Deborah Poritz, who was nominated to the court by
Republican Governor Christine Todd Whitman and then re-nominated
by Democratic Governor James McGreevey following the completion
of her initial seven-year term, served as Chief Justice from 1996 to
15
2006. The first female Attorney General of New Jersey, Poritz earlier
16
served as chief counsel to Republican Governor Thomas Kean. Stuart
Rabner, who was nominated to the court by Democratic Governor John
Corzine, began his current tenure as Chief Justice in 2007. Rabner
17
previously served as Corzine’s chief counsel and Attorney General.
Although slight, there is a perceptible shift between the more purposedriven Poritz Court and the more textually-anchored Rabner Court. Yet
neither court has exhibited the same degree of purposivism that
18
animated earlier constitutional decisions, such as Abbott and Mount
absurdity”) (emphasis added)). For a more complete discussion of Scalia’s concurrence in
the case, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 621-23
(1990) [hereinafter Eskridge, The New Textualism].
13
For a brief discussion of the development of judicial activism on the New Jersey
Supreme Court, see CHARLES S. LOPEMAN, THE ACTIVIST ADVOCATE: POLICY MAKING IN
STATE SUPREME COURTS 119 (1999) (describing the influence of New Jersey Supreme Court
Chief Justice Vanderbilt in the development of a judicial philosophy of activism that
permeated the New Jersey Supreme Court and survived his retirement to influence future
justices). According to Lopeman, “[j]udicial policy making by the New Jersey court is now
an integral part of the state’s governing apparatus.” Id. (citation omitted).
14
Justice James R. Zazzali served as Chief Justice for one year between Chief Justices
Poritz and Rabner. See David W. Chen, Corzine Elevates a Supreme Court Justice and Taps
Another Judge to Succeed Him, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2006, http://travel.nytimes.com/2006
/09/22/nyregion/22court.html?scp=6&sq=zazzali&st=cse (“By elevating Justice Zazzali,
who turns 70 next June, Mr. Corzine is effectively giving himself more time to pick a new
chief justice.”).
15
See Biography: Deborah T. Poritz, DRINKERBIDDLE, http://www.drinkerbiddle.com
/dporitz/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2011); see also Michael Booth, Avoiding Constitutional
Confrontation, Governor Renominates Poritz as Chief Decision Allays Fears of Loss of
Judiciary’s Independence, 172 N.J. L.J. 341 (2003).
16
See Biography: Deborah T. Poritz, supra note 15.
17
See Chief Justice Stuart Rabner, N.J. JUDICIARY, http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us
/supreme/rabner.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
18
Abbott v. Burke, 100 N.J. 269 (1985). For a brief history of the landmark education
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19

Laurel, which have brought such acclaim and notoriety to the New
20
Jersey Supreme Court. In fact, throughout the past decade, the court
has been carrying out a remarkably similar version of the more
measured approach to statutory interpretation that was first ascribed to
21
New Jersey courts in an editorial note in the 1954 Rutgers Law Review.
Addressing the use of extrinsic aids, which generally consisted of
22
different forms of legislative history, the author concluded that the
consultation of such sources depended on an initial finding of statutory
23
ambiguity. Although the author noted that “the test of ambiguity [was]
24
not a hard and fast rule” and that the courts did not shy away from
25
considering such extrinsic sources strictly as a means of corroboration,
the need to first identify textual ambiguity still functioned as a focal
case that has spanned three decades, see History of Abbott, EDUC. LAW CENTER,
http://www.edlawcenter.org/ELCPublic/AbbottvBurke/AbbottHistory.htm (last visited Apr.
20, 2011).
19
S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151 (1975). For a brief
history of the groundbreaking affordable housing case, see History of the Mount Laurel
Decisions, N.J. DIGITAL LEGAL LIBR., http://njlegallib.rutgers.edu/mtlaurel/aboutmtlaurel
.php (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
20
See David Voreacos & Terrence Dopp, N.J. Supreme Court Weighs School Cuts
Amid Impasse, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK., Jan. 5, 2011, http://www.businessweek.com/news
/2011-01-05/n-j-supreme-court-weighs-school-cuts-amid-impasse.html (“New Jersey’s top
court . . . developed a reputation for liberal decisions through such cases as the so-called
Mount Laurel rulings. In that decision, the justices held that zoning that resulted in
exclusion of minorities was the same as racial discrimination.”).
21
See Serena Perretti Bowen, Editorial Notes, Extrinsic Aids to Statutory Interpretation
— The New Jersey View, 8 RUTGERS L. REV. 486, 486 (1954) (arguing that the New Jersey
courts at all levels did not accept “[t]he radical view” that rejected “the plain meaning rule
and permit[ted] the admission of extrinsic aids even if they raise[d] an ambiguity in an
otherwise clear statute”). For more general discussions of the New Jersey court system’s
handling of statutory cases, see C. Dallas Sands, Developments in the Field of Legislation,
10 RUTGERS L. REV. 2 (1955) (discussing different theories of statutory interpretation
adopted by judges at all levels of the New Jersey judiciary) and GEORGE STILES HARRIS,
CASES ON STATUTES OF NEW JERSEY (1925) (providing early statutory case citations with
brief explanations).
22
Bowen addresses: “Journals of the Legislature;” “Amendments Made During
Consideration of the Original Bill;” “Committee Reports;” “Debates;” “Constitutional
History;” “Introducer’s Statement;” “Testimony of a Legislator;” “Commission and Agency
Reports;” “Message of the Executive;” “Title and Marginal Notes;” and “Preamble.” See
Bowen, supra note 21.
23
See id. at 500 (“The admission of extrinsic aids to the interpretation of statutes in
New Jersey seems to rest on a preliminary finding by the court that the statute is
ambiguous.”).
24
Id.
25
Id. (“Despite the fact that a statute has been found to be clear, the courts have
considered the extrinsic materials and used them as a corroboration of the interpretation.”).
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point of the interpretive process.
In order to compare and analyze the court’s statutory jurisprudence
26
under the two chief justices, I focused on the role of legislative history.
Legislative history is particularly illuminating because of its
27
controversial role in statutory opinions as a flashpoint that tends to
28
divide conservative textualists and more liberal, purpose-driven
29
jurists. In the most comprehensive study to date of the United States
Supreme Court’s use of legislative history, David S. Law and David
26

For a timeline of the role legislative history has played in the United States, primarily
in the United States Supreme Court, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 208-29 (1994).
[hereinafter ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION]. In her 1954 Note, Bowen differentiates between legislative history at the
federal level, which she argues “refers to the process through which a bill goes from its
introduction to its passage,” and New Jersey’s definition of legislative history, which she
argues “is the legal history of the statute, i.e. previous statutes on the same subject.” Bowen,
supra note 21, at 487 (citations omitted). Yet the current court, under both chief justices,
generally relies upon what Bowen would refer to as legislative history at the federal level.
See, e.g., Owens v. Feigin, 194 N.J. 607 (2008) (referencing signing statements, Senate
Judiciary Committee Statement, sponsors’ statement, and gubernatorial signing statement);
Serrano v. Serrano, 183 N.J. 508 (2005) (reviewing sponsors’ statement, gubernatorial
conditional veto, and meeting of the Joint Committee on Automobile Insurance Reform).
Thus my coding for legislative history combines the two concepts, except in instances in
which the court specifically resorts to the separately coded judicial canon of construction in
pari materia to analyze earlier statutes on the same or related topic. See, e.g., State v.
Hodde, 181 N.J. 375, 379 (2004) (“Statutory provisions, however, cannot be read in
isolation. They must be construed in concert with other legislative pronouncements on the
same subject matter so as to give full effect to each constituent part of an overall legislative
scheme.” (citations omitted)).
27
See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance on Legislative
History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117, 119
(2008) (“Critics of legislative history have long maintained that it lacks neutrality as an
interpretive resource. Unlike the dictionary or the canons of construction, committee reports
and floor statements are produced by partisans — actors with a stake in the legislative
contest to which they are contributing.”); see also OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:
A RE-EVALUATION OF THE STATUS OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
(1989) (attacking certain uses of legislative history by highlighting the theoretical
weaknesses of intentionalism); Alex Kozinski, Should Reading Legislative History be an
Impeachable Offense?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 807, 812 (1998) (describing the “widespread
misuse of legislative history to achieve substantive ends”).
28
See Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE
L.J. 371 (decrying excessive reliance on legislative history by fellow judges).
29
Differentiating between text-oriented judges and purpose/consequence judges, United
States Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer notes that the former try to avoid making use
of “the legislative debates that compose the history of the statute’s enactment in Congress.”
STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 89 (2010) [hereinafter
BREYER, DEMOCRACY WORK].
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Zaring found that ideology is a crucial factor in determining whether or
30
not a Justice will cite legislative history. Although legal concerns
regarding a statute’s form and content were the primary forces driving
legislative history citations, the liberal Justices still relied upon
31
legislative history more often than their conservative counterparts.
Justice Scalia, a conservative textualist, opposes the use of legislative
32
history because it is not subject to Article I, Section VII’s
33
34
bicameralism and presentment requirement and therefore is not law.
Scalia has not been shy about voting with the majority on the outcome
of the case but writing a separate concurrence voicing his displeasure
35
with the majority’s use of legislative history in reaching its decision.
Justice Breyer, Scalia’s intellectual and ideological counterweight, on
30

See David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court and the
Use of Legislative History, 51 WM. AND MARY L. REV. 1653 (2010).
31
Id. at 1739 (confirming what earlier studies have found: “liberal Justices are generally
more inclined than conservative Justices to make use of legislative history.”).
32
In spite of his trenchant criticism of legislative history, Justice Scalia has been more
than willing to sign on to conservative opinions that include extensive references to
legislative history. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120
(2000) (signing on to the O’Connor majority opinion’s use of legislative history in the form
of the “rejected proposal rule”). See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 27, at 117
(“Intriguingly, Justice Scalia’s strong resistance to legislative history when used by liberal
Justices does not extend to majorities authored by his conservative colleagues.”).
33
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“Every Bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President
of the United States[.]”).
34
See SCALIA, supra note 9, at 35 (arguing that unlike legislative history, such as
committee reports, a statute “has a claim to our attention simply because Article I, section 7
of the Constitution provides that since it has been passed by the prescribed majority . . . it is
law”); see also Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We are
here to apply the statute, not legislative history, and certainly not the absence of legislative
history. Statutes are the law . . . .”). Justice Scalia is not alone; his primary conservative
partner in advocating this viewpoint is the Honorable Frank H. Easterbrook, Chief Judge of
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. See In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir.
1989) (“The Constitution establishes a complex set of procedures, including presidential
approval (or support by two-thirds of each house). It would demean the constitutionally
prescribed method of legislating to suppose that its elaborate apparatus for deliberation on,
amending, and approving a text is just a way to create some evidence about the law, while
the real source of legal rules is the mental process of legislators.”).
35
See, e.g., Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 219 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“I join all except Parts III-B, IV, and V
of the Court’s opinion. The first of these consists of a discussion of the legislative history of
the Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977 . . . . I find that discussion
unnecessary to the decision. It serves to maintain the illusion that legislative history is an
important factor in this Court’s deciding of cases, as opposed to an omnipresent makeweight
for decisions arrived at on other grounds.” (citations omitted)).
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the other hand, has been the United States Supreme Court’s most vocal
36
supporter of the use of legislative history. In his most recent book,
Justice Breyer argues that judges interpreting statutes can look to “a
37
wide range of relevant legislative materials.” Although not advocating
for the use of legislative history in every case, Breyer argues that it can
38
be very helpful in discerning the meaning of statutes in difficult cases.
He explains that most of the cases that reach the Supreme Court involve
complicated statutory language and therefore benefit from judicial
39
consultation of legislative history.
This Article also focuses on legislative history because of how
easily accessible it is to New Jersey Supreme Court justices and their
40
clerks. According to a forthcoming study by recent Yale Law School
graduate and current D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Clerk Brian Barnes,
New Jersey is one of a minority of states that makes such material
41
accessible on-line. Even prior to the rise of the Internet, the State
36

See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992) [hereinafter Breyer, Legislative History] (providing examples of
the usefulness of legislative history in rendering decisions).
37
BREYER, DEMOCRACY WORK, supra note 29, at 92.
38
See Breyer, Legislative History, supra note 36, at 848 (“Using legislative history to
help interpret unclear statutory language seems natural. Legislative history helps a court
understand the context and purpose of a statute.”). For a more in-depth discussion of Justice
Breyer’s views on statutory interpretation, see STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY:
INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 85-110 (2005).
39
See BREYER, DEMOCRACY WORK, supra note 29, at 88. A number of scholars have
attempted to trace the ebb and flow of legislative history references in Supreme Court
decisions. Compare Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History
in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U.
L. REV. 277 (noting a marked decline over the past decade in the use of legislative history in
statutory interpretation decisions), with Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of
Legislative History in the Supreme Court, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 205 (describing the success of
Justices Breyer and Stevens in combating Scalia’s attempted purge of legislative history).
40
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILLIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT,
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 304 (2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter EFG
LEGISLATION] (exploring potential criteria for using legislative history, the authors write: “A
moderate position would be that legislative history should be consulted only if it is readily
available to the average lawyer” and “can be routinely discerned by interpreters at
reasonable cost” (citations omitted)).
41
See Brian Barnes, The Transformation of State Statutory Interpretation (May 28,
2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). The New Jersey State Library’s
website contains complete legislative histories dating back to 1998 and is currently in the
process of scanning and updating legislative histories from 1974-1997. See Legislative
Histories, N.J. STATE LIBR., http://law.njstatelib.org/njlh (last visited Apr. 26, 2011). New
Jersey and Illinois are the only two states “to retrospectively make previously public
materials electronically accessible.” Barnes, supra, at 16 n.80 (citations omitted).
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Library was busy compiling in-depth legislative materials in hard copy.
Barnes found that the rather inclusive records contain (where
applicable) statements of intent, committee statements, floor
amendments, and gubernatorial veto messages or press releases. From a
comparative standpoint, New Jersey’s legislature is one of only twelve
in the nation that generates committee reports similar to those created
42
by congressional standing committees. New Jersey is also only one of
43
twenty-nine states that maintains records of floor proceedings and one
44
of twenty-eight states that records or transcribes committee hearings.
Thus the absence of any references to legislative history in New Jersey
45
Supreme Court opinions cannot be attributed to inaccessibility.
Yet the State Library’s maintenance of such comprehensive
records inevitably leads justices to consider the relative interpretive
value of different forms of legislative history. Committee statements
and floor amendments, for example, are both part of the legislative
process as it takes place in “real time,” but the former purportedly
represents the views of multiple members whereas individual
representatives often introduce the latter. A gubernatorial veto message,
on the other hand, is generated after the bill has already passed both
houses and thus is not contemporaneous with the actual legislative
debate. Should it be afforded less weight? Although it is beyond the
scope of this Article to address what types of legislative history were
available to the justices in each case, the Appendix lists the different
forms of legislative history referenced in each majority opinion in order
46
to provide a baseline for further research.
This Article contains seven Parts. Part I offers a brief overview of
the dominant theories in the field of statutory interpretation, with an
emphasis on the role of legislative history. Part II addresses the
development of the modern New Jersey judiciary system, beginning
42

See Barnes, supra note 41, at 6. New Jersey is also the only state that makes its
standing committee reports dating back to 1980 electronically accessible. The other states
with such reports online only provide more recent ones. See id. at 7.
43
See id. at 9.
44
See id. at 12.
45
If not yet available on-line, the New Jersey State Library has hard copies of all
codified enactments dating back to the early 1970s. See WILLIAM H. MANZ, GUIDE TO STATE
LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE MATERIALS 267 (7th ed. 2008).
46
See Appendix. For a hierarchy of legislative history sources, see The New Textualism,
supra note 12, at 636-40 (listing from most authoritative to least authoritative: Committee
Reports; Sponsor Statements; Rejected Proposals; Floor & Hearing Colloquy; Nonlegislator Drafters and Sponsors; Legislative Silence and Subsequent History).
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with the adoption of the state’s current Constitution in 1947. Part III
considers the relative lack of statutory interpretation scholarship at the
state level and Columbia Law Professor Abbe R. Gluck’s theory of
“Modified Textualism.” Outlined in Gluck’s recent Yale Law Journal
article, “Modified Textualism” is a rigid hierarchical method of
statutory interpretation that attempts to find common ground between
47
textualism and purposivism. Part IV advances an explanation for the
Poritz Court’s approach to statutory interpretation during the first half
of the decade, and Part V analyzes the statutory jurisprudence of the
Rabner Court. Part VI discusses the general institutional factors
influencing the Rabner Court’s decision-making process and potential
areas for future research. Part VII comments on the brief and moderate
tenure of former New Jersey Supreme Court Justice William J.
Brennan, Jr. and delves into the broader strategic and normative
question regarding the importance of decisional outcome versus
interpretive methodology.
I. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION & THE ROLE OF
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The significance of the court’s approach to statutory interpretation
is best captured by the work of former Yale Law School Dean and
current Second Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Guido Calabresi. In A
Common Law for the Age of Statutes, Calabresi observed that during the
twentieth century, “we have gone from a legal system dominated by the
common law . . . to one in which statutes . . . have become the primary
48
source of law.” The New Jersey court system, including the supreme
court, is no exception. In his 1955 Rutgers Law Review article,
Developments in the Field of Legislation, Professor C. Dallas Sands
noted the relatively low number of “strictly ‘common law’ cases” and
the strikingly high percentage of statutory cases decided by the New
49
Jersey courts. Thus prior to delving into New Jersey Supreme Court
47

See Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750 (2010)
[hereinafter Gluck, States as Laboratories].
48
GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982) (emphasis
added).
49
See Sands, supra note 21, at 14 (“Statistics establish that the business of determining
and declaring the operative effect of written law is a major vocation of the New Jersey
courts. . . . Among 483 decisions reported with opinions (including per curiam opinions
wherever they stated the grounds of decision) during the past year, only 113 were strictly
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cases, it is important to address different theories and methods of
statutory interpretation advanced by leading legislation scholars.
Although current scholarship is almost exclusively based on United
States Supreme Court case law, the justices in Trenton are engaged in
statutory interpretation nearly every day and inevitably encounter many
of the same statutory questions faced by their counterparts on the United
States Supreme Court.
Unfortunately, even if a newly confirmed New Jersey Supreme
Court justice were inclined to adopt a so-called dominant theory of
interpretation, she would soon realize that there is far from universal
agreement within the academy. There is even less of a consensus over
the proper nomenclature. Whereas some scholars focus on New
50
Textualism, Intentionalism, and Pragmatism,
others discuss
51
Textualism, Purposivism, and Intentionalism. Based on a review of the
scholarly literature and analysis of New Jersey Supreme Court statutory
decisions over the past decade, the most relevant theory is
Intentionalism, followed by a combination of Textualism and
Purposivism. Unlike Textualism, however, which in its most basic form
prescribes a text-based method of interpretation, Intentionalism and
Purposivism suggest interpretive objectives that do not necessarily
require specific judicial maneuvers. Yet even Textualism is subject to
interpretive variations.
A. Textualism & Modified Textualism
Textualism revolves around the primacy of the statute’s text,
52
grounded in the opacity and complexity of the legislative process. The
exact language of a statute may have been the key to ensuring its
53
passage and thus textualism calls on judges to focus on the text itself.
But more importantly, from a theoretical perspective, textualists are

‘common law’ cases in the sense that they involved no apparent issues of written law. By
way of contrast there were 370, or nearly three-fourths of the cases (not counting
constitutional law cases), which involved written-law issues in one form or another.”).
50
See Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO.
L.J. 341 (2010).
51
See Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory Interpretation, The
Supermajoritarian Difficulty, and the Separation of Powers, 99 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming
2011).
52
See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 450
(2005).
53
See id.
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skeptical of judges’ attempt to divine legislative “intent.” According to
leading textual scholar John Manning, legislatures comprised of
multiple representatives do not share an unexpressed intent on contested
54
issues. United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia sums up
this viewpoint when he writes: “It is the law that governs, not the intent
55
of the lawgiver.” Instead of trying to divine the legislature’s
“subjective” intent, textualists aim to identify “a sort of ‘objectified’
intent — the intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text
56
of the law . . . .” The quest for a so-called “objectified” intent leads
textualists to scorn the use of legislative history and instead rely on
judicially-crafted cannons of statutory interpretation to help them decide
57
difficult cases.
58
Like any theory, textualism has evolved over time. And just like
any theory’s believers, textualism’s adherents fall at different points
along the text-based spectrum. Traditional textualism was grounded in
the “plain meaning rule” in which the text was the best indicator of a
statute’s meaning, but the legislative history was consulted for
59
confirmation. “New Textualism,” on the other hand, advances a
60
“harder plain meaning rule.” Championed by Justice Scalia, “New
Textualism” represents a significant shift in the use of legislative
history. By the end of Scalia’s second term, the United States Supreme
Court had nearly halved the number of instances in which it looked to
61
legislative history to confirm the plain meaning of a statute. The text
54
Id. at 420 (“[M]ulti-member legislatures do not have an actual but unexpressed
‘intent’ on any materially contested interpretive point . . . .” (citations omitted)).
55
SCALIA, supra note 9, at 17.
56
Id. (emphasis added).
57
Id. at 29-30 (“My view that the objective indication of the words, rather than the
intent of the legislature, is what constitutes the law leads me, of course, to the conclusion
that legislative history should not be used as an authoritative indication of a statute’s
meaning.”); see also Eskridge, The New Textualism, supra note 12, at 643 (describing the
work of leading New Textualist Frank Easterbrook as “assert[ing] that judges’ reliance on
legislative history to discern legislative intent amounts to nothing more than ‘wild guesses’”
(citing Frank Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 548 (1983))).
58
For a historical overview of textualism, see Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of
Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5-43 (2006) (discussing different aspects of textualism,
including “Textualism’s Roots;” “Textualism’s Precursors;” “The Emergence of Modern
Textualism;” “Textualism’s Reign;” and “Textualism’s Missteps”).
59
William Eskridge has argued that “the plain meaning rule has traditionally been a
‘soft’ rule — the plainest meaning can be trumped by contradictory legislative history.”
Eskridge, The New Textualism, supra note 12, at 626 (citations omitted).
60
Id. at 656.
61
Id. at 657 (noting a decrease from eighteen instances in the 1986 Term when Justice
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became truly paramount and legislative history did not necessarily have
62
any role to play. Although extreme in terms of its disregard for
63
64
legislative history, “New Textualism” embraces context, especially in
65
regards to statutory structure, and select canons of judicial
66
construction.
67
New Textualism may be influential on the nation’s highest court,
but Abbe Gluck argues that “Modified Textualism” is more influential
on some of the states’ highest courts. Discussed in greater detail in Part
III, infra, “Modified Textualism” also focuses on the primacy of the text
and does not permit citations to legislative history for the sole purpose
68
69
of confirmation. Yet in the presence of textual ambiguity, which even
Scalia joined the United States Supreme Court to eleven instances in the 1988 Term in
which legislative history was used to confirm a statute’s plain meaning).
62
Id. at 658 (“More recent opinions of the [United States Supreme] Court by Justices
sympathetic to the new textualism are more rigid: Not only does the Court not begrudge
legislative history any legitimate role, but the Court does not even stoop to analyze
legislative history arguments.”).
63
That being said, Scalia has not uniformly abstained from consulting legislative
history. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J.
concurring) (allowing for potential absurdity to justify the consultation of “all public
materials, including the background of [the rule] and the legislative history of its adoption”
(emphasis added)).
64
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV.
1509, 1532 (1998) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW (1997)) (“It is a truism that interpreting a text requires context. Scalia
seeks to turn this truth to his advantage.”).
65
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 64 (1994) (“Because interpretation is a social enterprise,
because words have no natural meanings, and because their effect lies in context, we must
consult these contexts.”).
66
See Eskridge, The New Textualism, supra note 12, at 663 (resorting to substantive
policy canons reluctantly, the new textualists “seek a revival of canons that rest upon
precepts of grammar and logic, proceduralism, and federalism”).
67
But see Elliot M. Davis, Note, The Newer Textualism: Justice Alito’s Statutory
Interpretation, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 983, 983-84 (2007) (arguing that Justice Alito’s
“newer textualism,” which does not advocate for the categorical exclusion of legislative
history, is more likely to have a greater influence on the United States Supreme Court’s
statutory jurisprudence in the coming years).
68
See Gluck, States as Laboratories, supra note 47, at 1758 (“Modified textualism has
two salient differences from the original: it ranks interpretive tools in a clear order —
textual analysis, then legislative history, then default judicial presumptions — and it
includes legislative history in the hierarchy.”).
69
For a critique of “Modified Textualism,” see Ethan J. Leib & Michael Serota, The
Costs of Consensus in Statutory Construction, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 47, 60 (2010),
http://yalelawjournal.org/2010/7/30/leib_serota.html (“The unwillingness of modified
textualism to allow legislative history to be utilized for confirmatory rather than
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70

Scalia recognizes does occur on occasion, judges will resort to
71
legislative history to attempt to divine a statute’s meaning. If, and only
if, the legislative history does not provide clarity, the judges will next
72
turn to judicial canons of statutory construction. Gluck may disagree
with the New Textualists about the role of legislative history, but she is
in agreement with them over intentionalism’s relative lack of
importance. According to Gluck, the current divide is between
73
textualism and purposivism. Yet her broad strokes obscure the fine
differences between intentionalism and purposivism — the former of
which has a far greater impact on the New Jersey Supreme Court’s
statutory jurisprudence.
74

75

B. Intentionalism & The Funnel of Abstraction

The quest for statutory intent by American judges can be traced all
the way back to John Marshall. Unwilling to limit the United States
Supreme Court’s interpretive toolbox to strict textualism, but
uncomfortable with the exercise of unrestrained equitable powers,
Marshall aimed to strike a balance by focusing on discerning legislative
76
intent. Victoria Nourse, a legal scholar and Obama nominee to the
expansionary uses is a quite substantial cost that may very well impair decisionmaking in
easy cases.”).
70
See United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 307-08 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(finding the language of 18 U.S.C. § 5037(c)(1)(B) to be ambiguous).
71
See Gluck, States as Laboratories, supra note 47, at 1758.
72
See id.
73
See id. at 1762 (devoting Part I, Section A to the methodological debate of
“Textualism Versus Purposivism”).
74
For a broader and more theoretical discussion of intentionalism, see ESKRIDGE,
DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 26, at 14-25; see also FRANK B. CROSS,
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 59 (2009) (noting that under
intentionalism, “the court’s objective should be to ascertain the legislature’s intent
underlying the statute and ideally how the legislature would have intended this particular
statutory interpretation case to be decided”).
75
See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 353 (1990) [hereinafter Eskridge & Frickey,
Practical Reasoning].
76
See John Choon Yoo, Note, Marshall’s Plan: The Early Supreme Court and Statutory
Interpretation, 101 YALE L.J. 1607, 1615 (1992). For a more recent example from the New
Jersey Supreme Court, see Michael Booth, Zazzali, Named Chief Justice, Says He’s a
Realist about Caretaker Term, N.J. L.J., Sept. 25, 2006 (taking issue with critics who claim
judges legislate from the bench, former New Jersey Supreme Court Chief Justice said upon
his elevation from Associate Justice to Chief Justice: “That’s an incorrect perception . . .
Above all the Court seeks to determine what the Legislature intended. The Court makes
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77

Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, writes that such intentionalism
carried into the twentieth century. According to Nourse, for most of the
past century, courts were generally expected to handle statutory
78
interpretation cases by searching for the legislature’s intent. Courts
employed an “eclectic” approach that generally included looking at the
79
statute’s text and legislative history. In their leading textbook on
statutory interpretation, William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. Frickey, and
Elizabeth Garrett add that the eclectic approach included more than just
text and legislative history: courts would examine “the statute’s text,
canons of statutory interpretation, the common law, the circumstances
80
of enactment, principles of equity, and so forth.” Regardless of how
exhaustive the list of extrinsic sources may be, legislative history is a
crucial component of any form of intentionalism. From an
intentionalist’s perspective, it would only seem strange for judges not to
81
look to the legislative materials that accompany the statute in question.
Intentionalists resort to extrinsic sources because they fundamentally
believe that a legislative majority, like an individual person, can have
“coherent, but unexpressed background intentions” that can inform the
82
meaning of their statutorily-uttered words.
Intentionalist-eclecticism is best understood through the prism of
83
the Eskridge/Frickey Funnel of Abstraction. The two scholars move
painstaking efforts to divine the legislative intent”).
77
See Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, President Obama Names
Victoria
F.
Nourse
to
U.S.
Court
of
Appeals
(July
14,
2010),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president-obama-names-victoria-f-nourse-uscourt-appeals; see also Larry Sandler, Obama Again Nominates Butler to Federal Bench, J.
SENTINEL (Milwaukee), Jan. 5, 2011, http://www.jsonline.com/news/wisconsin/
112973059.html (announcing Obama’s re-nomination of Nourse to the Seventh Circuit
following the Senate’s failure to vote on her appointment during the 111th Congress).
78
See Nourse, supra note 51; see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILLIP P. FRICKEY &
ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 691, 998 (4th ed. 2007) [hereinafter EFG CASES] (“American
courts in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries generally proclaimed their fidelity to
legislative ‘intent’ . . . .” (citations omitted)).
79
See Nourse, supra note 51.
80
See EFG CASES, supra note 78, at 691 (citations omitted).
81
See id. at 58.
82
See Manning, supra note 52, at 423-24.
83
It is worth noting that Eskridge and Frickey do not view their Funnel of Abstraction
as an extension of intentionalism but rather as a concrete representation of “Aristotle’s
theory of practical reasoning.” Eskridge & Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 75, at
323. The authors actually dismiss the three grand theories of statutory interpretation
(intentionalism, purposivism, and textualism) before advancing their “positive model of
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away from the grand theory of intentionalism to advance a methodology
for statutory interpretation that takes into account the competing values
influencing judicial decision-making. Building on the complexity of
human reasoning, Eskridge and Frickey describe a nonlinear approach
in which the problem solver takes into consideration all of the potential
84
solutions and then weighs them against his internal value system.
Legal arguments, they posit, are like cables in that the arguments are
85
strongest when they weave together as multiple threads — threads that
86
do not operate in a vacuum but rather interact with one another. The
different threads, however, are not equal in strength. Although their
relative value will depend upon the nature of the statute under
consideration, their base values are generally established from the
outset. Thus a textual thread may not determine the outcome all by
87
itself, but it starts off as more influential than a general-purpose thread.
Eskridge and Frickey divide these threads into three broad categories
that judges look to when rendering their interpretation. On a spectrum
ranging from the funnel’s more concrete base to its more abstract
88
mouth, the categories include “Textual Considerations,” “Historical
89
90
Considerations,” and “Evolutive Considerations.” Regardless of how
practical reasoning.” Id. at 345. Yet I am including their model in my discussion of
intentionalism because it’s pragmatism does not fit as well with the rigidity of textualism or
the more free-flowing approach of purposivism. As will be discussed infra, the New Jersey
Supreme Court has been moving towards a textually-anchored funnel of abstraction
approach to statutory interpretation under the overarching, theoretical umbrella of
intentionalism.
84
Id. at 348 (“When solving a problem, we tend to test different solutions, evaluating
each against a range of values and beliefs we hold as important.”). Eskridge and Frickey
simply recognize the reality that judges cannot completely prevent their own values and
beliefs from influencing their statutory decisions.
85
See id. at 351 (building on the work of CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, 5 COLLECTED
PAPERS para. 264 (C. Hartshorne & P. Weiss eds., 1960)).
86
Id. at 351.
87
Id. (“For most of the [United States] Supreme Court Justices, a persuasive textual
argument is a stronger thread than an otherwise equally persuasive current policy or fairness
argument, because of the reliance and legislative supremacy values implicated in following
the clear statutory text.” (footnote omitted)).
88
Id. at 354 (“Our practical reasoning model starts with the prevailing Supreme Court
assumption that the statutory text is the most authoritative interpretive criterion.”).
89
Eskridge & Frickey, Practical Reasoning, at 356 (“In accordance with the [United
States Supreme] Court’s practice, our practical reasoning model also considers the original
expectations of the Congress that enacted the statute,” which is best represented by
legislative history, followed by legislative purpose).
90
Id. at 358 (“These are highly abstract inquiries having less connection to text and
legislative expectations, and hence less authority in a democracy. Yet these inquiries are
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one groups the different categories, the key is that the interpreter moves
91
back and forth along the funnel-shaped spectrum, reviewing and
92
passing judgment on the varying sources.
C. Purposivism
Former President of the Israeli Supreme Court and worldrenowned jurist Aharon Barak writes: “[e]very statute has a purpose,
93
without which it is meaningless.” Comprised of both objective and
94
subjective factors, such purpose is often difficult for a judge to discern.
According to Eskridge, Frickey, and Garret, the theory of purposivism
is actually a manifestation of legislative intent, which can be divided
95
96
into three separate categories. In addition to “specific intent” and
97
“imaginative reconstruction,” the authors also include “purposivism,”
which is a bit more abstract and speaks to the legislature’s “general
98
intent.” The theory is attributed to Legal Process scholars Henry M.
Hart and Albert M. Sacks, both former Harvard Law School professors.
pertinent, because the enactment of statutes is part of a dynamic process.” (footnotes
omitted)). The authors define this category as “social and legal consequences not anticipated
when the statute was enacted” and “current values, such as ideas of fairness, related
statutory policies, and (most important) constitutional values.” Id. at 359.
91
The spectrum is superimposed against a theoretical funnel, which the authors chose
for the following reasons:
First, the model suggests the hierarchy of sources that the Court has in fact
assumed . . . Second, the model suggests the degree of abstraction of each
source . . . Third, the model illustrates the pragmatistic and hermeneutical
insights explained above: In formulating and testing her understanding of the
statute, the interpreter will move up and down the diagram, evaluating and
comparing the different considerations represented by each source of
argumentation.
Id. at 353-54.
92
Id. at 354.
93
AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 136 (2006) (arguing that this purpose
“is made up of the objectives, the goals, the interests, the values, the policy, and the function
that the statute is designed to actualize”).
94
See id.
95
EFG LEGISLATION, supra note 40, at 222 (“The trouble starts when you try to
determine what is meant by legislative intent . . . .”).
96
Id. (explaining the specific intent of legislators as “how they actually decided a
particular issue of statutory scope or application”).
97
Id. (explaining imaginative reconstruction as “what the legislators would have
decided had they thought about the issue”).
98
Id. at 229 (“Purposivism sets the originalist inquiry at a higher level of generality. It
asks, ‘What was the statute’s goal?’ rather than ‘What did the drafters specifically
intend?”‘).
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Citing Hart and Sacks’ seminal work, Nourse writes that in the “postwar” era, the two eminent professors taught their law students to
“‘[d]ecide what purpose ought to be attributed to the statute . . . and then
[to] . . . [i]nterpret the words of the statute immediately in question so as
99
to carry out the purpose as best it can . . . .”‘ The leading proponents
on the modern United States Supreme Court are Justice Stephen Breyer
100
and recently retired Justice Paul Stevens. Unlike textualists, who view
themselves as the faithful agents of the legislature, purposivists envision
a more collaborative partnership in which the judges work together with
101
the legislators to determine statutory meaning. As equal, or at least
near-equal partners, purposivists are able to take on a more assertive
role when interpreting statutes. Legislative history, moreover, forms the
foundation of their “interaction” with legislators and thus purposivists
generally do not limit themselves to the statutory text. As Professor
Abbe Gluck observes, there are many different types of purposivists,
but they all share a willingness to consult a broad array of sources to
determine statutory meaning and to bend “formalistic methodological
102
rules.” In the end, legislative “purpose” provides judges with the best
opportunity to claim the mantle of intent while utilizing legislative
103
history to advance their own policy goals.
II. EVOLUTION OF “JERSEY JUSTICE:”
CONSTITUTIONAL STORY

104

A

Prior to the adoption of the 1947 state constitution, the New Jersey
105
judiciary was plagued with problems. The poorly functioning 1844
99

Nourse, supra note 51 (citing HART & SACKS, supra note 2, at 1374-80).
Gluck, States as Laboratories, supra note 47, at 1764 (citing Jody Freeman &
Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV.
51, 86-87 (2007)).
101
Id. (citing Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. COLO. L. REV.
225, 243 (1999)).
102
Id.
103
See EFG LEGISLATION, supra note 40, at 230 (citing United Steelworkers v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193, 254 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)); see also WILLIAM D. POPKIN, A
DICTIONARY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 222 (2007) (“Purposivism allows judges some
discretion to be creative in elaborating legislative purpose while claiming, with some
justification, that they are deferring to what the legislature might have wanted to
accomplish.”).
104
CARLA VIVIAN BELLO & ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT II, JERSEY JUSTICE: THREE
HUNDRED YEARS OF THE NEW JERSEY JUDICIARY (2d ed. 1996).
105
See Symposium, The “New Judicial Federalism” and New Jersey Constitutional
Interpretation, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 823, 823 (1997) (“Prior to the convention in
100

YOFFIE (DO NOT DELETE)

320

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

5/5/2011 7:35 PM

Vol. 35:2

Constitution “divided courts and concepts of law and equity, to the
disadvantage of litigants, and lacked any unifying administrative
106
power.” Seventeen state courts bereft of clearly defined jurisdictional
boundaries led to judicial gridlock. In the absence of a unified statewide
court system, parties did not know which court was the proper forum for
their assorted petitions, especially since judges served on multiple
courts and failed to adhere to any standardized procedure. The New
Jersey judicial system was rightfully derided as “‘the most antiquated
and intricate that exist[ed] in any considerable community of English
107
108
speaking people.’” The third state constitution, however, marked a
turning point for the state judiciary. The document’s “centerpiece was
the Judicial Article, which gave the new Supreme Court unprecedented
administrative authority, vested in the Chief Justice, to control the
109
administration of all courts in New Jersey.” The 1947 constitution
protected the court from overt political interference and allowed it to
110
establish its own rules. The appointment of Arthur T. Vanderbilt, a
past president of the American Bar Association and former dean of New
York University Law School, as the court’s first chief justice solidified
111
the transition and paved the way for a statewide judicial renaissance.
By the time of Vanderbilt’s death in 1957, the entire New Jersey
judicial system — and especially the supreme court — was respected
throughout the nation with a reputation for effective administration and
112
progressive decision-making. Vanderbilt’s steady hand at the helm
enabled future justices to take bold action. In his study of judicial
behavior on six state supreme courts, Professor John Patrick Hagan
1947, New Jersey’s judicial system was described as the worst in the country.”).
106
Richard J. Hughes, Foreword to ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE NEW JERSEY
CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE, at xv (2d ed. 1997).
107
Alan V. Lowenstein, The Legacy of Arthur T. Vanderbilt to the New Jersey Bar, 51
UTGERS
L. REV. 1319, 1332 (1999) (citing Richard Hartshore, Progress in New Jersey
R
Judicial Administration, 3 RUTGERS L. REV. 161, 162 (1949)).
108
New Jersey established its first state constitution in 1776. The state ratified new
constitutions in 1844 and 1947. See Robert F. Williams, New Jersey’s State Constitutions:
From Ridicule to Respect, N.J. LAW., June 1997, at 8, 8-9.
109
Hughes, supra note 106, at xv.
110
See id.
111
See Symposium, supra note 105, at 824 ( “[W]ith the appointment of Arthur T.
Vanderbilt as Chief Justice, the perception of the New Jersey courts changed drastically.”).
See generally ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT II, CHANGING LAW, A BIOGRAPHY OF ARTHUR T.
VANDERBILT (1976) (discussing the life and career of Chief Justice Vanderbilt).
112
See G. ALAN TARR & MARY CORNELIA ALSIS PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN
STATE AND NATION 194 (1988).
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selected New Jersey because of its national reputation for activism and
113
innovation. Describing the state’s highest court forty years after its
third reincarnation, Professors Alan Tarr and Mary Porter wrote: “Since
World War II, the New Jersey Supreme Court has assumed a role of
leadership in the development of legal doctrine, thereby earning for
114
itself a national reputation for activism and legal reformism.”
The New Jersey Supreme Court has been both revered and reviled
115
for such a noted record of “judicial activism.” In a speech at Rutgers
Law School in Newark, New Jersey, Associate Justice Virginia Long
proudly stated that the court “has made clear to all New Jerseyans that
our state constitution is a separate, valid, and important source of rights
116
for the people of New Jersey.” Justice Long listed a number of the
court’s cutting-edge constitutional decisions that addressed
117
controversial social issues ranging from racial profiling to parental
118
notification for abortion. Long is not the only prominent voice to
119
focus on the court’s progressive constitutionalism. Harvard Law
113

See John Patrick Hagan, Patterns of Activism on State Supreme Courts, 18 PUBLIUS
97, 97 (1988) (“Three of the courts — California, Michigan, and New Jersey — have been
the subjects of extensive prior analysis; they are also widely regarded as being among the
three most active and innovative state supreme courts in the nation.” (citations omitted)).
114
TARR & PORTER, supra note 112, at 184; see also John B. Wefing, The Performance
of the New Jersey Supreme Court at the Opening of the Twenty-First Century: New Case,
Same Script, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 769 (2001) [hereinafter Wefing, Performance] (“In the
years after the Constitution of 1947 was adopted, the New Jersey Supreme Court earned a
national reputation as an activist, progressive and generally liberal state supreme court.”
(citations omitted)).
115
In his 1971 study on the role of judges in four state supreme courts (Louisiana,
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Massachusetts), Henry Glick found that New Jersey judges
have a fairly expansive view of their role. According to Glick, “[t]he New Jersey judges
believe courts make policy and they tend to innovate and even make proposals to the state
legislature . . . In this way, the New Jersey Supreme Court appears to contribute frequently
to policy change in the state.” HENRY ROBERT GLICK, SUPREME COURTS IN STATE POLITICS:
AN INVESTIGATION OF THE JUDICIAL ROLE 47 (1971).
116
Long, supra note 1, at 548.
117
State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632, 635 (2002) (requiring police officers to have
“reasonable suspicion” before asking a driver stopped on the highway to agree to a search).
118
Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 165 N.J. 609 (2000) (holding the
Parental Notification for Abortion Act, requiring a minor woman to notify her parents
before obtaining an abortion, to be unconstitutional).
119
See John B. Wefing, The New Jersey Supreme Court 1948-1998: Fifty Years of
Independence and Activism, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 701, 705 [hereinafter Wefing, Fifty Years]
(“Additionally, the court has enthusiastically embraced the New Federalism movement. As
the United States Supreme Court has become more conservative in recent years, many state
courts have chosen to use their state constitutions to grant greater rights than given under the
United States Constitution. The New Jersey Supreme Court has regularly done this.”
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Professor Duncan Kennedy once described it as the “quintessential
120
liberal activist reformist court in the country,” and University of
Michigan Law Professor Yale Kamisar called the New Jersey Supreme
121
Court “the most innovative in the country.” These comments largely
122
123
stem from the court’s well-known Abbott and Mount Laurel
124
decisions, which attempted to overhaul the state’s educational system
and affordable housing program, respectively, through controversial
125
interpretations of the state constitution. As a result of these highprofile cases, a significant portion of the legal scholarship analyzing the
126
New Jersey Supreme Court has focused on the justices’ “innovative”
127
constitutional decisions.
(citations omitted)).
120
See Symposium, supra note 105, at 824 (citing Duncan Kennedy’s speech to New
Jersey Judicial College).
121
Bruce S. Rosen, A Bold Court Forges Ahead, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 5, 1984, at 1.
122
Abbott v. Burke, 100 N.J. 269 (1985).
123
S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151 (1975).
124
See Wefing, Fifty Years, supra note 119, at 703 (“The court’s activism and
liberalism were particularly evident in the court’s decisions dealing with school funding and
low and moderate income housing.”).
125
See, e.g., TARR & PORTER, supra note 112, at 233 (“Although they have rarely
challenged the [United States Supreme] [C]ourt’s authority directly, the justices in Trenton
have declined to defer to its judgment and have exploited the leeway available to them to
pursue their own constitutional vision.” (emphasis added)).
126
See JOHN B. GATES & CHARLES A. JOHNSON, THE AMERICAN COURTS: A CRITICAL
ASSESSMENT 111 (1990) (writing that New Jersey “appears on every list of innovative or
prestigious courts”). Even Karen Foster, who argues in a 1999 article in the Albany Law
Review that the New Jersey Supreme Court is not as independent and progressive as it is
portrayed in the popular and scholarly literature, focuses exclusively on the Court’s
constitutional jurisprudence. See Karen L. Foster, High Court Studies: The New Jersey
Supreme Court in the 1990s: Independence is Only Skin Deep, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1501, 1501,
1541 (1999) (analyzing the New Jersey Supreme Court from the Brennan perspective that
the United States Supreme Court sets the floor, and not the ceiling, for the protection and
advancement of individual rights — thereby allowing state high courts to use their state
constitutions to advance individual civil rights and liberties — Foster argues that “there
have certainly not been many shining examples of independent state constitutional
adjudication from the New Jersey Supreme Court”). Foster adds: “While it has gone farther
than many state high courts by consistently recognizing that the opportunity for greater
rights exists under the state constitution, it has taken few strides to develop these rights.” Id.
at 1541.
127
See, e.g., Lawrence Berger, Inclusionary Zoning Devices as Takings: The Legacy of
the Mount Laurel Cases, 70 NEB. L. REV. 186 (1991); John M. Payne, Norman Williams,
Exclusionary Zoning, and the Mount Laurel Doctrine: Making the Theory Fit the Facts, 20
VT. L. REV. 665 (1996); see also Paul L. Tractenberg, Beyond Educational Adequacy:
Looking Backward and Forward through the Lens of New Jersey, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L.
411 (2008); Jeremiah Lenihan, Note, Lurking Behind the Shadow of Enduring Reform?
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III. WHAT ABOUT THE STATUTES? — DEARTH OF STATE
SCHOLARSHIP & RISE OF MODIFIED TEXTUALISM
The court’s docket, however, is not only comprised of
128
constitutional cases. Like most high court dockets in the nation, the
129
New Jersey Supreme Court hears a large number of statutory cases.
Yet in spite of the significance and pervasiveness of statutory cases
before the court, there has been no systematic analysis of such
decisions. Although law students and scholars have touched upon the
130
subject, I am not aware of any recent, scholarly attempt to dissect the
court’s interpretive toolbox in order to discern its methodology — or
131
lack thereof — for deciding statutory cases. The lack of scholarship in
School Funding and New Jersey’s School Funding Reform Act of 2008, 34 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 119 (2009). Outside of constitutional law, there has been some scholarship
focusing on the New Jersey Supreme Court’s innovations in the realm of tort law. See, e.g.,
TARR AND PORTER, supra note 112, at 225 (discussing the New Jersey Supreme Court’s
groundbreaking tort rulings regarding products liability); Bradley C. Canon & Lawrence
Baum, Patterns of Adoption of Tort Law Innovations: An Application of Diffusion Theory to
Judicial Doctrines, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV 975, 978 (1981) (ranking the New Jersey judicial
system as the most innovative in tort law during the post-War era); Wefing, Performance,
supra note 114, at 814-18 (covering the New Jersey Supreme Court’s liberal
constitutionalism in the areas of tort reform, the death penalty, school funding, and criminal
procedure).
128
For a novel discussion of the impact statutes have on modern-day constitutionalism,
see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 6 (2010) (“The Constitution pervasively depends upon statutes to
fill in the huge holes in our governance structure and norms.”).
129
See Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV.
74 (2000); see also ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 26, at 1
(arguing that statutory cases are so pervasive because “[t]hroughout Western history,
obeying the law has depended on the interpretation of statutes”). State courts are not only
busy interpreting state statutes but most interpretation of federal statutes also takes place in
state courts. See Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as
“Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. (forthcoming June 2011) (manuscript at 108
n.12) [hereinafter Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation] (citing Michael E. Solimne,
Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the Twenty-First Century, 35 IND. L. REV.
335, 362 (2002)), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1680020.
130
See Note on the Norplant Case and State Court Reliance on Committee and Bill
Reports, in EFG CASES, supra note 78, at 998 [hereinafter Note]; see also Scott Fruehwald,
Pragmatic Textualism and the Limits of Statutory Interpretation: Dale v. Boy Scouts of
America, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 973, 974 (2000) (criticizing the New Jersey Supreme
Court for “exceed[ing] the limits of statutory interpretation” in the highly controversial
decision regarding homosexuals and the Boy Scouts of America organization). Right before
the timeframe of my dataset, the New Jersey Supreme Court handed down Dale v. Boy
Scouts of America, which was eventually overturned by the United States Supreme Court.
Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 160 N.J. 562 (1999), rev’d, 530 U.S. 640, 661 (2000).
131
For a less recent analysis that focuses on the entire New Jersey judicial system’s use
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this area is not overly surprising. Gluck notes in her recently published
Yale Law Journal article on statutory interpretation in state courts that
current legislation scholars are obsessively focused on the tiny fraction
132
of cases in the federal court system. In fact, Gluck and Mercer Law
133
Professor Linda Jellum are the only two scholars who have attempted
any comprehensive study of modern statutory interpretation at the state
134
level. Jellum, however, focused on legislative interpretive rules and
135
their ramifications for the separation-of-powers debate. Gluck, on the
other hand, analyzed cases from five state supreme courts (Oregon,
Texas, Connecticut, Wisconsin, and Michigan) to support her thesis
regarding the use of “Modified Textualism” in state high courts across
the nation. Under Gluck’s “Modified Textualism,” courts first look to
the text to divine a statute’s meaning. If the meaning is clear, the
interpretive process ends there, without any reference to extrinsic
sources. The justices only move to the second tier to consult the
statute’s legislative history if they find the text ambiguous. The rigid
analytical framework concludes with tier three, judicial canons of
statutory construction, which the justices only resort to if the text and
136
legislative history fail them. Gluck argues that the theory of “Modified
of extrinsic aids in statutory interpretation, see Bowen, supra note 21.
132
See Gluck, States as Laboratories, supra note 47, at 1753-55 (providing the “first
close study of modern statutory interpretation in several state courts of last resort,” she
writes: “The vast majority of statutory interpretation theory is based on . . . the mere two
percent of litigation that takes place in our federal courts”).
133
Linda D. Jellum, “Which is to be Master,” the Judiciary or the Legislature? When
Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 837, 875 (2009). For
scholarship focusing on legislative interpretive rules, see Scott, supra note 50 (providing a
comprehensive fifty-state survey of the codified canons of statutory interpretation).
134
For an analysis of the use of legislative history by Wisconsin state courts, see
Kenneth R. Dortzbach, Legislative History: The Philosophies of Justices Scalia and Breyer
and the Use of Legislative History by the Wisconsin State Courts, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 161,
219 (1996) (noting that the state’s courts have not repudiated the use of legislative history
but have become more careful about referencing it in the age of Scalia).
135
For scholarship analyzing earlier periods, see Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., State Courts and
the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1501 (2006) (focusing on early
American statutory interpretation in the state courts); William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About
Words: Early Understandings of the ‘Judicial Power’ in Statutory Interpretation, 17761806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990 (2001) [hereinafter Eskridge, All About Words] (highlighting
early New Jersey statutory decisions to be discussed infra).
136
Gluck, States as Laboratories, supra note 47, at 1758 (describing Modified
Textualism’s “strict hierarchy,” which “emphasizes textual analysis (step one); limits the
use of legislative history (only in step two, and only if textual analysis alone does not
suffice); and dramatically reduces reliance on the oft-used policy presumptions, the
‘substantive canons’ of interpretation (only in step three, and only if all else fails)”).
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Textualism” is unique in that it not only establishes a clear
methodological order for approaching statutory cases but also elevates
text while still allowing for the use of Scalia’s bête noir: legislative
137
history.
Trying to weave together the statutory case law from five state
high courts, Gluck understandably provides only one New Jersey
138
Supreme Court case citation. The reference to Pizzullo v. New Jersey
Manufacturers Insurance Co. is included in a long footnote, along with
cases from a number of other jurisdictions, to support her preliminary
view that most state high courts similarly embrace some form of
139
Modified Textualism. Yet Gluck admits that her broader findings (in
states other than Oregon, Texas, Connecticut, Wisconsin, and
140
Michigan) are extremely premature and require verification.
Accepting Gluck’s challenge, I turned my focus to the New Jersey
141
Supreme Court, which is hardly known for its rigid adherence to
137

Id. at 1759.
Id. at 1844 n.353 (citing Pizzullo v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 196 N.J. 251 (2008)).
139
Id. at 1844 (“The majority of state courts may now routinely apply the basic
modified textualist rule: first step, text only; if ambiguity is found, then second step,
legislative history.”).
140
See id. (“These observations are extremely tentative; close readings of cases across
the fifty states are required to confirm them and to determine if the courts are acting
consistently.”).
141
Adapting Gluck’s case selection methodology to Westlaw Next, I read the entire
population of cases located through the following search strategy: Restricting my
“Advanced Search” to New Jersey Supreme Court cases (accessed through the “State
Materials” tab), I entered “legislative history” into “Find documents that have – All of these
terms” and entered the date range 01-01-2000 – 12-31-2009 into “Document Fields – Date.”
The advanced search returned 203 cases, which I then sorted by date. In order to confirm the
size of my dataset, I ran a similar search in LexisNexis. I restricted my search to New Jersey
Supreme Court cases within the same date range (01-01-2000 – 12-31-2009) and then
inserted “leg! hist!” under “terms and connectors.” The search returned 207 cases, which I
deemed sufficiently similar in size to proceed. In regards to the selection of ten years, I was
looking for a manageable time period that would take into account the increasing influence
of Justice Scalia’s textualism at the federal level and the appointment of New Jersey
Supreme Court Chief Justices by both political parties. By focusing on “legislative history,”
I admit that my search process was somewhat flawed in that the best examples of “modified
textualism” may not include any references to “legislative history” because the majority
strictly relied on unambiguous text. Thus, in order to ensure a more complete dataset, I ran a
supplemental Westlaw Next search in which I kept the same timeframe for New Jersey
Supreme Court cases but removed “legislative history” and instead inserted “statutes” in the
“Document Fields – Headnote.” The advanced search returned nintey cases, which I then
sorted by date. Of the ninety cases, I read, coded, and included the forty-six that did not
appear in my initial search, thus providing a complete dataset of 249 cases. Not surprisingly,
many of the forty-six cases involved disputes over the application of statutes of limitations.
138
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142

textualism.
143
In the now decade-old case Perez v. Wyeth, which restricted the
application of the learned intermediary doctrine to products not directly
marketed to consumers, Justice Pollock sharply criticized the court in
his dissent: “The majority opinion sustains itself only by ignoring the
plain language of an unambiguous statute, the New Jersey Products
Liability Act, and by substituting its own policy preference for that of
144
the Legislature.” Citing the court’s own precedent, Pollock argued for
adherence to Modified Textualism’s first tier: “When a statute is clear, a
court need not look beyond the statutory language to discover the
145
legislative intent.” Yet even Justice Pollock, in the midst of his heated
dissent, cited the “passed bill memorandum” prepared for Governor
146
Kean to support his argument regarding the true legislative intent.
Although the fact that he was writing in dissent may have influenced his
147
choice of sources, Justice Pollock was nonetheless unsatisfied with
what he himself adamantly declared to be “the plain language of an
See, e.g., Price v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 182 N.J. 519, 525 (upholding an equitable tolling of
the statute of limitations related to the recovery of uninsured motorist benefits). As noted
above, I separated out the opinions handed down under Chief Justice Zazzali, who served as
Chief Justice for approximately one year in between the terms of Chief Justice Poritz and
Chief Justice Rabner. In order to be thorough, I made sure to read the Zazzali Court’s
decisions to avoid missing any potentially glaring inconsistencies in the court’s statutory
jurisprudence. Not surprisingly, I did not find anything out of the ordinary during Zazzali’s
short tenure. The twenty-eight Zazzali cases run from Rows 55-82 in the Appendix.
142
See Note, supra note 130 (“New Jersey courts are among the most willing to rely on
legislative history to construe statutes; judges in that state are willing to consider committee
reports whether or not the statute’s text is ambiguous.” (citations omitted)).
143
Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 161 N.J. 1, 32 (1999). The court’s approach in Perez is
so well known that it is one of the only state supreme court decisions in the leading
casebook on statutory interpretation. See EFG CASES, supra note 78, at 814-18.
144
Perez, 161 N.J. at 33 (Pollock, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also id. at 42
(“To conclude, when enacting the NJPLA, the Legislature chose to confine the expansion of
product liability law. The majority’s preference for a different policy does not justify
ignoring the one chosen by the Legislature.”).
145
Id. at 35 (citing State v. Kittrell, 145 N.J. 112, 123 (1996)).
146
Id.
147
Justice Pollock also cited the Senate Committee statement that accompanied the bill.
See id. at 35-36. Yet the New Jersey Product Liability Act was somewhat unique in that it
specifically provided that “committee statements that may be adopted or included in the
legislative history of this act shall be consulted in the interpretation and construction of this
act.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-1a (West 2011). Given that aspect of the bill, I did not
include Justice Pollock’s citation to the Senate committee statement as an example of a nontextual reference and instead relied upon a non-committee statement to demonstrate his use
of an extrinsic source. It is beyond the scope of this Article to address the role of legislative
history in statutes that require justices to consult such sources in conjunction with the text.
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148

unambiguous statute.” Perez, decided right before the timeframe of
my study, reveals the court’s internal struggle between purposivism and
textualism — both of which are carried out in the name of
intentionalism.
IV. THE PORITZ COURT’S EMBRACE OF THE “FUNNEL OF
149
ABSTRACTION”
150

The Poritz Court, led by Chief Justice Deborah Poritz, was first
and foremost committed to carrying out the legislature’s intent. In
repeated statutory decisions, the court made clear that the most
important “goal in interpreting statutes is to discern and to give effect to
151
the underlying legislative intent.” Yet the court sought to “effectuate
the legislative intent in light of the language used and the objects sought
152
to be achieved.” Thus, the court did not generally announce a

148

Perez, 161 N.J. at 33.
The Poritz Court may have implicitly accepted the Eskridge/Frickey premise that
“standing alone, textualist and archeological approaches to statutory interpretation are
overly simplistic techniques” that lack a certain degree of legitimacy. Eskridge & Frickey,
Practical Reasoning, supra note 75, at 383. But the Poritz Court, which rarely referred to
general societal norms or evolving public standards in its decisions, did not go so far as to
utilize “all the relevant factors and all [the] problem-solving skills” associated with the
Eskridge/Frickey funnel. Id. (emphasis added).
150
The Poritz’s Court more free-wheeling interpretive methodology, as compared to
that utilized by the Rabner Court (discussed infra) may help explain the court’s lower
percentage of unanimous decisions (49.7% vs. 53.7%) and higher percentage of opinions in
which concurrences were filed (23.4% vs. 11.1%) (Separately written decisions that
concurred in part and dissented in part were coded as if a concurrence and a dissent had
been filed in the case). Needless to say, the Rabner Court calculations are based on a smaller
sample size. By focusing on the last decade, moreover, I measured the end of the Poritz
Court’s tenure and the beginning of the Rabner Court’s tenure, when the latter was more
susceptible to the common “honeymoon” period experienced under a new chief justice. See
Pamela Corley, Amy Steigerwalt & Artemus Ward, The Chief Justice of the United States:
Uniter or Divider? (July 25, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/8/1/6/9/p181694_index.h
tml) (discussing the “honeymoon effect” experienced by new chief justices). Nonetheless,
the percentages of cases in which dissents were filed were nearly identical (43.1% for the
Poritz Court and 44.4% for the Rabner Court). Thus, there does not appear to have been
much of a honeymoon for the Rabner Court.
151
James v. Bd. of Trs. of Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 164 N.J. 396, 404 (2000) (citation
omitted); see also Stryker Corp. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 168 N.J. 138, 157 (2001) (“[T]he
paramount purpose of construing a statute [is] to ascertain the legislative intent.” (citations
omitted)).
152
McCann v. Clerk of City of Jersey City, 167 N.J. 311, 320 (2001) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted).
149
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153

commitment to Modified Textualism. In the cases in which it did,
moreover, the majority usually created a more expansive tier two that
not only included legislative history but also general statutory
154
purpose. In a 2004 decision dealing with New Jersey’s Consumer
Fraud Act, the court cited its own precedent to state: “If the statute is
clear and unambiguous on its face and admits of only one interpretation,
we need delve no deeper than the act’s literal terms to divine the
155
legislature’s intent.” Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Zazzali
added: “[I]f the statute is not clear and unambiguous on its face, we
consider sources other than the literal words of the statute to guide our
interpretive task. The court considers extrinsic factors, such as the
statute’s purpose, legislative history, and statutory context to ascertain
156
the Legislature’s intent.” A broader second tier is not overly surprising
given that the Poritz Court was ultimately less interested in text-driven
intentionalism and more committed to a looser form of purpose-driven
157
intentionalism that simply began with the text. In New Jersey v.
153
The Poritz Court had plenty of modified textualist-driven precedents to cite,
especially DiProspero v. Penn (discussed in Part V infra as one of the key citations for the
Rabner Court), which was decided during its tenure. DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 49293 (2005); see also Lozano v. Frank Deluca Constr., 178 N.J. 513, 522 (2004)
(“Interpretation of a statute begins with ‘the plain meaning of the provision at issue.’ When
‘the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, and susceptible to only one interpretation,
courts should apply the statute as written without resort to extrinsic interpretative aids.’
However, if two interpretations of the language are plausible, a reviewing court must
interpret the statute to effectuate the legislative intent, utilizing extrinsic evidence when it is
helpful.” (citations omitted)).
154
See, e.g., State v. Livingston, 172 N.J. 209, 218 (2002) (‘“As a general rule of
statutory construction, we look first to the language of the statute. If the statute is clear and
unambiguous on its face and admits of only one interpretation, we need delve no deeper
than the act’s literal terms to divine the Legislature’s intent.’ If the text is susceptible to
different interpretations, we look beyond the literal words of the statute and consider
‘extrinsic factors, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and statutory context to
ascertain the [L]egislature’s intent.’” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
155
State v. Pena, 178 N.J. 297, 307 (2004) (citing State v. Thomas, 166 N.J. 560, 567
(2001)) (dealing with the purchase of prepaid long distance phone cards that did not provide
the advertised savings on rates).
156
Id. (emphasis added); see also Clymer v. Summit Bancorp., 171 N.J. 57, 66 (2002)
(“If the text . . . is susceptible to different interpretations, the court considers extrinsic
factors, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and statutory context to ascertain
the legislature’s intent.” (citations omitted)).
157
See, e.g., Lafage v. Jani, 166 N.J. 412, 431 (2001) (“When all is said and done, the
matter of statutory construction . . . will not justly turn on literalisms . . . or the so-called
formal rules of interpretation; it will justly turn on the breadth of the objectives of the
legislation and the commonsense of the situation.” (citations omitted)); In re Distrib. of
Liquid Assets upon Dissolution Reg’l High Sch. Dist. No. 1, 168 N.J. 1, 17-18 (2001) (“To
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158

Bunch, the court had to determine whether a second-degree eluding
statute applied to a defendant who only endangered himself during the
159
chase. In the unanimous opinion, the majority dutifully began with the
statute’s text and indicated the court’s obligation to end its analysis in
160
the face of unambiguous text. The majority proceeded to determine
that “there [was] no facial ambiguity in the eluding statute,” and
therefore, the court “[had] no reason to resort to extrinsic aids such as
161
legislative history.” Yet the very next sentence indicated that the
justices did in fact look to the legislative history. How else could the
court have known that “in this case the legislative history provided no
162
meaningful assistance in resolving the question before [them]?” In
163
State v. Crawley, the court declared its fidelity to legislative intent and
began with the text, which the majority determined was ambiguous. As
a result of the competing textual interpretations, the majority consulted
judicial canons and legislative history, which comprise Gluck’s second
164
and third tiers, respectively — thus creating a super-second tier. The
hold otherwise would be to ignore the clear overriding purpose of the statutory framework
in favor of ritualistic application of statutory language divorced from context.”). Whether
she realized it or not, Chief Justice Poritz was in many ways adhering to the state courts’
early judicial practice of “tempering statutory words with factual, common law, and other
contexts.” Eskridge, All About Words, supra note 135, at 1011. In his article analyzing early
judicial practice in the states following the American Revolution, Eskridge writes that New
Jersey judges — like their late 18th century counterparts in the other states he studied — did
not restrict themselves to the statutory text but rather “considered statutory goals and spirits,
the common law, natural law and common sense, and constitutional values relevant to the
application of statutes.” Id. at 1012 (citing Ex’rs of Barracliff v. Admin. of Griscom, 1
N.J.L. 224 (Sup. Ct. 1793); Smith v. Minor, 1 N.J.L. 16 (1790)).
158
New Jersey v. Bunch, 180 N.J. 534 (2004).
159
Id. at 538 (“Under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b, a person is guilty of second-degree eluding if,
‘while operating a motor vehicle on any street or highway in this State,’ the driver
‘knowingly flees or attempts to elude any police or law enforcement officer after having
received any signal from such officer to bring the vehicle . . . to a full stop . . . [and] the
flight or attempt to elude creates a risk of death or injury to any person.’ The primary issue
in this appeal is whether the term ‘any person’ . . . includes the eluding defendant.”).
160
Id. at 543 (“Consistent with our well-established rules of statutory construction, we
begin with the text of the statute. If the statutory language lends itself to only one
interpretation and that interpretation is consistent with the overall legislative scheme, we
must ‘apply the statute as written without resort to extrinsic interpretive aids.’ Embedded in
that canon of construction is the recognition that the terms used in a statute, if unambiguous
in meaning, are the clearest indicators of legislative intent.” (emphasis added) (citations
omitted)).
161
Id. at 546 (citations omitted).
162
Id. at 547.
163
State v. Crawley, 187 N.J. 440, 452-53 (2006).
164
See id. at 453 (“Because the face of the statute might suggest plausible alternative
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court, moreover, did not feel the need to find ambiguity in one before
moving on to the other, but rather considered both reliable extrinsic aids
in the face of textual ambiguity.
The Poritz Court, therefore, had actually adopted a method far
closer to William Eskridge and Phillip Frickey’s “practical reasoning
165
approach” to statutory interpretation. According to Eskridge and
Frickey (and as discussed in Part I.B. supra), judges do not limit
themselves to one piece of evidence but rather look to a number of
166
reference points that together form a “Funnel of Abstraction.” The
hierarchical funnel begins with more concrete sources and then becomes
increasingly abstract as it proceeds from the specific “rule of law”
category to the more general grouping of “democratic values,” and
finally, to the even more malleable “justice norms.” Like Gluck’s
model, the method of interpretation begins with text and includes
167
legislative history, but the modality differs in that it does not contain
168
strict tiers. Instead of stopping at any one point — as Gluck adherents
will, at step one in the case of unambiguous statutory text or at step two
in the case of ambiguous statutory text but unambiguous legislative
history — “the interpreter will move up and down the diagram,
evaluating and comparing the different considerations represented by

interpretations, we next look at related statutes and legislative history to shed light on the
contested language” (citing 2B Norman J. Singer, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 51.03 (5th ed. 1992) (“Statutes are considered to be in pari materia when they relate to the
same person or thing, to the same class of persons or things, or have the same purpose or
object.”) (footnote omitted))).
165
Eskridge & Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 75, at 351.
166
Id. at 353.
167
The funnel is formally comprised of the following levels (from “most concrete” to
“most abstract”): Statutory Text; Whole Act and Integration into Structure of Law;
Imaginative Reconstruction and Legislative History; Legislative Purpose; Evolution of
Statute; Current Values. Eskridge & Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 75, at 353-62.
However, I took a more expansive view of the funnel and coded for additional external
factors, as long as they fell under the three broad categories of “textual, historical, and
evolutive” considerations. Needless to say, I did not re-code for the Gluck tiers but rather
only included additional factors consulted according to the funnel.
168
Although text forms the concrete foundation of the funnel, it is still more paramount
in Gluck’s model in which it is the sole component of Modified Textualism’s first tier. The
Poritz Court often began with the text but also lumped it together with other funnel
components when interpreting statutes. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Land, 186 N.J.
163, 168 (2006) (looking to the Insurance Fraud Protection Act’s “plain language, statutory
purpose, and penalties to determine whether the Legislature addressed the question. Finally,
we examine prior case law addressing the issue.”).
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169

each source of argumentation.” This does not mean that the judges
will necessarily apply every funnel component, but rather that they will
weigh the relative value of each in the individual cases before them and
then consult where applicable. The majority’s “funnel” in State v. Pena
may not have been an exact replica of the Eskridge/Frickey model, but
it similarly moved beyond the text to include statutory purpose,
legislative history, and statutory context — the latter of which often
170
171
includes structure and precedent. In Miah v. Ahmed, a unanimous
Poritz Court determined that a displaced tenant was entitled to
relocation assistance, calculated at six times his regular rent based on
172
the “unambiguous statutory language.” Far from stopping at the text,
however, the court also considered the statute’s “public-policy
173
objectives.” The purpose-driven inquiry included an examination of
174
the statute’s evolution in the legislature, use of the judicial canon
175
176
“noscitur a sociis,” references to legislative history, deference to
177
state agency interpretations, and consideration of “the remedial goals
178
of the section’s statutory scheme.” Although the court did not
179
necessarily “slide up and down the funnel,” it also did not limit itself
180
to Gluck’s rigid regime. In Mani v. Mani, an alimony case, the
169

Eskridge & Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 75, at 353.
See State v. Pena, 178 N.J. 297, 308 (2004).
171
Miah v. Ahmed, 179 N.J. 511, 515 (2004).
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
Id. at 518. “Evolution” is one of the funnel’s more abstract components. See
Eskridge & Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 75, at 358.
175
Miah, 179 N.J. at 521 (“[T]he meaning of words [used in a statute] may be indicated
and controlled by those [words] with which they are associated.” (citing Germann v.
Matriss, 55 N.J. 193, 220 (1970))).
176
Id. at 523 (citing Assemb. 2267, 1993 Sess., 205th Leg., at 1 (N.J. 1993)).
177
Id. at 524 (noting that the Department of Community Affairs’ “interpretation of
section h provides even further support for [the court’s] conclusion” and referencing the
Agency’s May 1995 memorandum to its relocation officers). The unanimous court
explained: “Although we are not bound by an agency’s interpretation of a statute, we
generally accord it substantial deference when the Legislature has entrusted the agency with
the statute’s enforcement.” Id. (citation omitted).
178
Id. at 523.
179
ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 26, at 56 (“The
interpreter does not view the statutory text in isolation, but reads it in connection with the
legislative history, statutory practice and precedents, and current norms and values.”).
180
Mani v. Mani, 183 N.J. 70, 72 (2005) (reversing the holding of the intermediate
appellate court, the court found that marital fault should not be taken into consideration
when calculating alimony under § 2A:34-23(b) unless the fault had an adverse effect on the
170
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majority similarly engaged in a fairly eclectic analysis that examined
“the purposes underlying alimony, the words of the alimony statute,
181
[and] the legislative history behind the act . . . .” The decision,
particularly the discussion of certain forms of “outrageous” conduct that
“violate the social contract,” represented the funnel’s most abstract
182
“norms” component. Yet the most notable aspect of the decision was
that the opinion began with a discussion of the history of alimony
183
dating back to “early England.”
In some instances, although few and far between, the court began
with the text but then disregarded the literal reading in the name of
184
carrying out the statute’s spirit or purpose. In Perez v. Rent-A-Center,
185
Inc., for example, the court examined the rent-to-own industry in
which consumers can rent household appliances and other retail goods
with the option to purchase them at the end of their lease. In order to
determine the validity of the contracts under the Retail Installment Sales
186
Act (hereinafter “RISA”), the court began with the statutory text. Yet
once the court determined that the contracts were “not a perfect fit with
the words of the statute,” and therefore, not subject to regulation under
RISA, it cited a 1957 decision by former Chief Justice Joseph
Weintraub in which he declared: “[C]ases inevitably arise in which a
literal application of the language used would lead to results
187
incompatible with the legislative design.” The court proceeded to cite
finances of either party or was especially egregious).
181
Id. at 92-93.
182
Id. at 92 (noting that certain examples, such as “[d]eliberately infecting a spouse
with a loathsome disease,” embody “the concept that some conduct, by its very nature is so
outrageous that it can be said to violate the social contract, such that society would not abide
continuing the economic bonds between the parties”).
183
Id. at 78.
184
See, e.g., DeLisa v. Cnty. of Bergen, 165 N.J. 140, 147 (2000) (ruling in favor of the
employee in a Conscientious Employee Protection Act case, the court explained, “A settled
principle is that ‘statutes are to be read sensibly rather than literally and the controlling
legislative intent is to be presumed as ‘consonant to reason and good direction’”‘ (citations
omitted)). The court also justified its non-textual decision via the doctrine against absurd
results. Id. Instead of relying on the text, the court employed a funnel approach, relying on
“statutory purpose, CEPA’s legislative history and precedents from other jurisdictions.” Id.
at 146.
185
Perez v. Rent-A-Ctr., Inc., 186 N.J. 188, 193 (2006).
186
Id. at 205 (“At issue is whether Perez’s transaction with Rent-A-Center constitutes a
retail installment sales contract. RISA defines a “retail installment contract” as follows . . ..”
(citations omitted)).
187
Id. at 208 (citing New Capitol Bar & Grill Corp. v. Div. of Emp’t Sec., 25 N.J. 155,
160 (1957) (“It is frequently difficult for a draftsman of legislation to anticipate all
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RISA’s overall legislative purpose of protecting the public in order to
hold that the contracts in question were covered, thereby reinstating
188
Perez’s claims under the statute. Yet even in this decision, the court
did not restrict itself to text and purpose but also utilized judicial canons
189
of construction and referenced other funnel factors, such as legislative
190
191
history, to address Rent-A-Center’s arguments.
Critics of the Poritz court’s funnel-driven approach may argue that
it is not an approach at all but rather a free-wheeling methodology
bereft of logical consistencies. Some of the justices on the court
advocated for greater fidelity to the literal text. In his Trinity Cemetery
Association, Inc. v. Township of Wall concurrence, Justice Verniero
agreed with the majority’s two holdings but took issue with his
192
colleagues’ reliance on legislative history in reaching them. Justice
Verniero did not dispute that the legislative history supported the
majority’s conclusion; he just felt that “one need look no further than
193
the plain language of the Act to reach that result.” Arguing for the
literal enforcement of the statute’s terms, Verniero even took a passing
shot at the majority by citing United States Supreme Court Justice Felix
situations and to measure his words against them.”)). The court, citing its own precedent,
added: “It is not the meaning of isolated words, but the internal sense of the law, the spirit of
the correlated symbols of expression, that we seek in the exposition of a statute.” Id. at 209
(citing Caputo v. Best Foods, Inc., 17 N.J. 259 (1955)).
188
Id. at 209 (“In enacting RISA, the stated legislative purpose was protection of the
public interest through the regulation of the charges associated with the time sale of
goods.”).
189
See id. at 209 (construing remedial statutes liberally); id. at 211 (“[W]hen the
Legislature utilizes words that have previously been the subject of judicial construction, it is
deemed to have used those words in the sense that has been ascribed to them.” (citations
omitted)).
190
See id. at 215 (citing Governor Brendan Byrne, Statement in Signing S. 3005 and S.
3101 (Mar. 31, 1981)). The court explained, “[I]t is well-established that the governor’s
action in approving or vetoing a bill constitutes a part of the legislative process, and the
action of the governor upon a bill may be considered in determining legislative intent.” Id.
(citations omitted).
191
The court put heavy emphasis on the fact that Senate bill 3005, which removed
interest rate caps in RISA, was passed during the same legislative window, by the same
sponsors, as Senate bill 3101, which amended the criminal usury statute to create a new
interest rate cap ceiling that trumped the language of S. 3005. In addition to the court’s
textual argument regarding the explicit interaction of the two statutes, it also noted “that
statutes that are adopted on the same day should be read in pari materia . . . ..” Perez, 186
N.J. at 214 (citations omitted).
192
Trinity Cemetery Ass’n, Inc. v. Wall, 170 N.J. 39, 44-47 (2001).
193
Id. at 49 (citing State v. Butler, 89 N.J. 220, 226 (1982) to support his point that
“legislative history need not be considered when [the] statute is ambiguous on its face”).
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Frankfurter: ‘“Construction, no doubt, is not a mechanical process . . .
194
But there is a difference between reading what is and rewriting it.”‘ In
Marshall v. Klebanov, Justice Rivera-Soto offered a stinging dissent in
which he chastised the majority for disregarding the unambiguous, plain
195
language of the statute. In an emotionally charged case involving a
suicide and claims of psychiatric malpractice, the majority made no
196
attempt to hide its preference for the statute’s spirit over the text;
Justice Rivera-Soto, who opened his dissent with the statutory text,
197
refused to go along with his peers.
Yet the Poritz Court’s adoption of the Eskridge/Frickey Funnel of
Abstraction is in accord with Todd Rakoff’s essay in the Northwestern
University Law Review in which the Harvard Law Professor attacks
198
restrictive monolithic approaches to statutory interpretation. Rakoff is
primarily concerned with the rise of methodological stare decisis, a
199
theory advanced by Gluck, arguing that such restrictive and
194

Id. (citing Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)).
195
Marshall v. Klebanov, 188 N.J. 23, 42 (2006).
196
Id. at 37 (“[W]ords may be expanded or limited according to the manifest reason and
obvious purpose of the law. The spirit of the legislative direction prevails over the literal
sense of the terms.” (citations omitted)).
197
Id. at 42 (“The application of the legislative construct to this case is simple and
direct. Because the majority agrees that defendant did not incur a duty to ‘warn and protect,’
the mandated conclusion is self-evident from the plain language of the statute . . . .”).
198
See Todd D. Rakoff, Statutory Interpretation as a Multifarious Enterprise, 104 NW.
U. L. REV 1559, 1560 (2010).
199
For the purposes of this paper, I do not address the issue of methodological stare
decisis, which is a major component of Abbe Gluck’s work on statutory interpretation at the
state level. She notes that “[i]n the watershed case, Portland General Electric Co. v. Bureau
of Labor and Industries, [859 P.2d 1143 (Or. 1993)], the [Oregon Supreme] [C]ourt
unanimously announced a three-step methodology to control all future statutory
interpretation questions.” Gluck, States as Laboratories, supra note 47, at 1775. Although
the court later appeared to reverse course in Gaines v. State, 169 P.3d 1268 (Or. 2007), the
“sixteen-year period” represented a bold step in the field of statutory interpretation. See
Gluck, States as Laboratories, supra note 47, at 1776. Similar to the United States Supreme
Court, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court has never attempted to bind itself
methodologically. Although my dataset reveals a heavy reliance on case law precedent (to
the point where I stopped coding for it because it was so ubiquitous), I did not see any
attempt by the court to institute a system of methodological stare decisis for statutory cases.
From a normative standpoint, I am also torn between the benefits of methodological stare
decisis outlined by Gluck and the drawbacks of such an approach outlined by Leib and
Serota. Compare Gluck, States as Laboratories, supra note 47, at 1798 (noting the rule-oflaw benefits, including predictability and consistency for all involved actors, offered by
methodological stare decisis), with Leib & Serota, supra note 69, at 48 (arguing that “there
are distinctive, underappreciated benefits that result from methodological diversity and
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unpredictable approaches stifle the interpretive process. But Rakoff’s
emphasis on the existence of many different kinds of statutes is not as
relevant as his normative description of “[s]tatutory interpretation [as]
more open-ended, more dependent on wisdom — and . . . more
interesting — than the search for a comprehensive but monistic theory
201
allows.” The Poritz Court’s funnel bridges the gap between Rakoff’s
two poles, combining a wide range of sources capable of offering
wisdom to the interpreters with an overarching structure. Poritz would
agree with Rakoff that judges should and “are pursuing their craft by
202
choosing the right tool for the varying tasks at hand.” That broad
range of tools can be located in the funnel, which offers choice within a
restricted framework. The funnel, and by extension the Poritz Court’s
methodological approach, may not neatly fit with one form of
textualism or another, but that does not mean it lacks methodological
ordering. The funnel itself, like Modified Textualism, is simply another
interpretive option for judges.
V. THE RABNER COURT’S EMBRACE OF “MODIFIED
TEXTUALISM-LITE”
Abbe Gluck read Pizzullo (her one New Jersey case citation)
correctly: in a unanimous decision, Justice Hoens explained that the
court looks “first to the plain language of the statute, seeking further
guidance only to the extent that the Legislature’s intent cannot be
203
derived from the words that it has chosen.” But when “the language is
not clear and unambiguous on its face, [the justices] look to other
interpretive aids to assist [them] in [their] understanding of the

make our current regime of dissensus a more desirable approach.”). For a forceful defense
of the normative benefits of stare decisis in the realm of statutory interpretation, see Sydney
Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpretation Methodology?,
96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1863 (2008) (arguing “not only that courts should give doctrines of
statutory interpretation methodology stare decisis effect, but also that courts should give
even stronger stare decisis effect to doctrines of statutory interpretation than they give to
doctrines of substantive law”).
200
Rakoff, supra note 198, at 1560 (arguing that “there are many legitimate and useful
modes of statutory interpretation” and that “no theory that would justify its being the
‘consistently applied theory of statutory interpretation’”).
201
Id. at 1586.
202
Id. at 1560.
203
Pizzullo v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 196 N.J. 251, 264 (2008) (citing Roberts v. State
Police, 191 N.J. 516, 521 (2007)).
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204

Legislature’s will.” Deeming the term “election” to be ambiguous,
Hoens proceeded to quote from the Senate Sponsor’s Statement and
205
from the Commerce Committee’s Statement to help craft her opinion.
Thus, the justice’s decision represents the very embodiment of Gluck’s
“Modified Textualism,” at least in terms of the first two rigid tiers.
206
Gluck’s footnote, however, does not mention that intentionalism,
bordering on purposivism, drove the decision. Hoens stated that the
justices’ statutory “analysis requires that [they] first consider the
meaning and intent of [the] Legislature in enacting the statute that is at
207
the heart of the dispute.” In a case pitting a greedy insurance company
against a married couple severely injured in a car accident, the court had
no problem engaging in a tortured analysis of the allegedly ambiguous
term. Hoens also cited the “fundamental principles” of insurance policy
analysis, including the court’s “role in ensuring their conformity to
208
public policy and principles of fairness.”
Nonetheless, the court still felt the need to declare that the statute
was ambiguous before looking to the statute’s legislative history. And
209
Pizzullo, decided under Chief Justice Rabner, was not an anomaly but
204

Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 266-67 (citing Sponsor’s Statement to Senate Bill No. 804, 1992 Sess., 205th
Leg. (N.J. 1992); Senate Commerce Committee Statement to Senate Bill No. 804, 1992
Sess., 205th Leg. (N.J. 1992)). Like Brudney and Ditslear, I do not attempt to differentiate
between the various forms of legislative history. In keeping with the Brudney/Ditslear
method, “so long as legislative history [was] expressly identified and discussed by the
majority as either an affirmatively probative or a determining factor, [I] conclude[d] that it
was relied upon by the Court.” Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 27, at 128 (citations
omitted). This also implies that an isolated reference in the majority opinion to the phrase
“legislative history” did not serve as proof that the justices moved beyond Gluck’s text-only
tier one. For the sake of clarity, I created a scale from 0-3 (0: no factor; 1: contributing
factor; 2: partial reliance; 3: decisive factor) that measured the extent to which the court
relied on legislative history in rendering its decision. In a few instances, I included an N/A
ranking, which usually indicated an out-of-context reference to the phrase “legislative
history” that came up in my search but was in no way related to the court’s decision. See
Appendix. For an overview of the different forms of legislative history most commonly used
by both the Rabner and Poritz Courts and the frequency with which they were referenced in
majority opinions, see the two charts included at the beginning of the Appendix.
206
Like the Poritz Court, the Rabner Court is committed, first and foremost, to carrying
out the legislature’s intent. See, e.g., Lee v. First Union Nat. Bank, 199 N.J. 251, 259 (2009)
(“The goal when interpreting a statute is to determine and effectuate the Legislature’s
intent.” (citing D’Annunzio v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 192 N.J. 110, 119 (2007))).
207
Pizzullo, 196 N.J. at 263.
208
Id. at 270 (citing Gibson v. Callaghan, 158 N.J. 662, 669-70 (1999)).
209
Stuart Rabner was nominated as Chief Justice in 2007. See Jennifer Moroz & Elisa
Ung, Corzine Taps Rabner for Top Court Position, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 5, 2007,
205
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rather symbolic of the Rabner Court’s preferred methodological
210
approach to statutory interpretation: “Modified Textualism-lite.”
Unlike the Poritz Court’s more purpose-driven approach, the Rabner
211
Court repeatedly declares its fidelity to modified textualism, primarily
212
through its citations to DiProspero v. Penn:
A court should not ‘resort to extrinsic interpretative aids’ when ‘the
statutory language is clear and unambiguous, and susceptible to only
one interpretation . . . .On the other hand, if there is ambiguity in the
statutory language that leads to more than one plausible
interpretation, we may to turn to extrinsic evidence, ‘including
legislative history, committee reports, and contemporaneous
213
construction.’
214

In State v. Baker, the court outlined its commitment through a
reference to the section of Daiddone v. Buterick Bulkheading that cites
215
the above language from DiProspero. Beginning with the text, the
Baker court also stopped with the text, finding the plain language of the
statute under consideration (Interstate Agreement on Detainers, N.J.S.A.

http://www.philly.com/inquirer/home_top_stories/20070605_Corzine_taps_Rabner_for_top
_court_position.html.
210
Although a bit of a cross between Gluck’s “Modified Textualism” and
Eskridge/Frickey’s “Funnel of Abstraction,” Fruehwald’s “Pragmatic Textualism” is also
applicable to the Rabner Court for the theory’s recognition of the text as supreme but
willingness to look to extrinsic sources in the event that the text lacks clarity. See
Fruehwald, supra note 130, at 997-1013.
211
In Hardy ex rel. Dowdell v. Abdul-Matin, the dissent acknowledged that “the PIP
statute does not explicitly require knowledge of lack of permission,” but then criticized the
Rabner Court majority for ruling against the injured high school student based on the
statute’s literal interpretation. Hardy ex rel. Dowdell v. Abdul-Matin, 198 N.J. 95, 106
(2009) (Long, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, which was concerned with “social
necessity,” the majority’s literal reading was “‘inconsistent with the overall purpose’ of the
Act.” Id. (citations omitted). Yet on occasion, even the Rabner Court majority falls victim to
the sympathetic facts of the case and disregards the clear statutory text for a higher purpose.
See, e.g., Maglies v. Estate of Guy, 193 N.J. 108, 126 (2007) (rejecting the plain language of
the Anti-Eviction Act in order to uphold “the spirit of the law” and protect the impoverished
tenant who lost her mother). The dissent specifically criticized the majority for “fail[ing] to
adhere to and apply the plain language of the Act . . . .” Id. at 128 (Hoens, J., dissenting).
212
See, e.g., Patel v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm’n, 200 N.J. 413, 419 (2009); In re
Attorney Gens. Directive on Exit Polling: Media & Non-Partisan Pub. Interest Grps., 200
N.J. 283, 297 (2009); Burnett v. Cnty. of Bergen, 198 N.J. 408, 421 (2009); Mason v. City
of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 68 (2008); State v. Froland, 193 N.J. 186, 194 (2007).
213
DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492-93 (2005) (citations omitted).
214
State v. Baker, 198 N.J. 189, 193 (2009).
215
See id. at 193 (citing Daidone v. Buterick Bulkheading, 191 N.J. 557, 565-66 (2007)
(citing DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492)).
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216

2A:159A-1 to -15) to be unambiguous. In Klumb v. Board of
Education, the court similarly followed the methodology it announced
217
in Pizzulo by citing to DiProspero and only moving beyond the text
218
after first finding ambiguity. Yet I refer to the court’s interpretive
methodology as “Modified Textualism-lite” because it conveniently
219
ignores DiProspero when it is not inclined to limit itself to the text. In
some instances, the court will even cite DiProspero or Pizzullo and yet
not strictly adhere to the modified textualist regime outlined in those
220
cases.
For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court had to decide
whether indicted State Senator Wayne R. Bryant could use funds from

216

Id. at 193 (rejecting the defendant’s argument because it called for a construction of
the statute that was “inconsistent with the plain language” of the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers).
217
Klumb v. Bd. of Educ. of Manalapan-Englishtown Reg’l High Sch. Dist., 199 N.J.
14, 23-24 (2009) (“To discern the Legislature’s intent, courts first turn to the plain language
of the statute in question.” (citing DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492)). The court added: “‘If the
plain language leads to a clear and unambiguous result, then [the] interpretive process is
over.’ Where the plain meaning does not point the court to a ‘clear and unambiguous result,’
it then considers extrinsic evidence from which it hopes to glean the Legislature’s intent.”
Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
218
Klumb, 199 N.J. at 26 (“We view the language as ambiguous and therefore look
outside it for clues to its meaning.”).
219
William Eskridge has commented that the Rabner Court’s lack of strict fidelity to
DiProspero, coupled with its broader list of extrinsic sources for tier two, appears to him to
be more indicative of a textually-anchored funnel as opposed to a “Modified Textualismlite” system of statutory interpretation. See E-mail from William N. Eskridge, Jr., John A.
Garver Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School, to Author (May 30, 2010, 15:14 EST)
(on file with author). Although there is little practical difference between the two theories,
semantics matter, and I have chosen the latter based on the Rabner Court’s willingness to
restrict itself to Modified Textualism’s tier one, and therefore, not consult any sources
beyond the text. The funnel, even a textually-anchored one, on the other hand, is predicated
on the notion that judges will at least consider extrinsic sources in the face of unambiguous
text, even if they do not reference them. Yet I concede that the Rabner Court generally
muddles tiers two and three, combining Gluck’s tier two legislative history with extrinsic
sources other than Gluck’s tier three judicial canons of construction. Compare State v. Ortiz,
193 N.J. 278, 288 (2008) (noting that in the face of textual ambiguity, the court should
“resort to extrinsic interpretive aids, such as legislative history, canons of construction, or
the policy considerations behind the legislation” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)), with
In re Liquidation of Integrity Ins. Co., 193 N.J. 86, 94 (2007) (noting that in the face of
textual ambiguity, the court should “turn to extrinsic evidence, including legislative history,
committee reports, and contemporaneous construction” (emphasis added)). The Rabner
Court also generally refrains from demanding ambiguity at tier two, regardless of which
extrinsic source(s) it includes, before moving on to tier three.
220
See, e.g., Jen Elec., Inc. v. Cnty. of Essex, 197 N.J. 627, 643 (2009) (declaring the
text’s plain meaning to be “self-evident” and yet then referencing legislative history to
bolster its point).

YOFFIE (DO NOT DELETE)

2011

5/5/2011 7:35 PM

NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT

339
221

his candidate committee to cover his legal defense bills. Tasked with
interpreting the state’s Campaign Contributions Act, the court cited
DiProspero and began with the statute’s text. Following an exhaustive
review of the statute’s language, which included citations to two
222
dictionaries, the majority determined that the language was clear and
unambiguous. Yet the majority did not stop with the text: in addition to
affording Chevron deference to the Election Law Enforcement
223
Commission’s regulations, the court also proceeded to review the
224
relevant legislative history “[f]or the sake of completeness.” In State
225
v. Smith, moreover, the court similarly determined that the statute’s
language clearly indicated that there was no requisite mens rea; proving
possession of the defaced weapon, therefore, was sufficient for a guilty
226
verdict. Nonetheless, the court once again resorted to extrinsic sources
227
“for purposes of thoroughness.” This was a repeated pattern in which
the court seemed torn between Gluck’s Modified Textualism and
Eskridge/Frickey’s Funnel of Abstraction. The court was focused on the
statutory text’s ambiguity, or lack thereof, but could not quite help itself
from seeking additional confirmation. In Zabilowicz v. Kelsey, the final
case in the dataset, the court was interpreting the “Deemer Statute”
regarding its application to a New Jersey car accident involving two
228
out-of-state drivers. The dispute revolved around the provision of
221
See In re Election Law Enforcement Comm’n Advisory Op., 201 N.J. 254, 256
(2010). Although the Rabner Court heard this case on November 9, 2009, it did not hand
down a decision until March 8, 2010, and thus the case fell just outside of my dataset.
Therefore, the case is not coded in the Appendix.
222
There is some dispute as to whether dictionary citations constitute tier one or tier
three, but given their usefulness for textual analysis, I generally considered them to be part
of the first tier. Yet I listed the different dictionaries cited in the Eskridge/Frickey funnel
column of the Appendix.
223
“The regulations, singly and collectively, do not advance Bryant’s position that he
may use campaign funds to finance his criminal defense.” In re Election Law Enforcement
Comm’n Advisory Op., 201 N.J. at 265.
224
Id. at 266.
225
State v. Smith, 197 N.J. 325, 338 (2009).
226
Id. at 329.
227
Id. at 333 (“And, ordinarily, when a statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, we
‘need delve no deeper than the act’s literal terms’. . . That said, we shall assume for
purposes of thoroughness that the language of the statute contains some ambiguity and,
therefore, in such circumstances it is permissible to turn to extrinsic evidence for aid in
interpreting this statute.” (citations omitted)).
228
Zabilowicz, v. Kelsey, 200 N.J. 507, 510 (2009) (“N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.4 — known as
the ‘Deemer Statute’ — provides benefits and burdens to out-of-state drivers insured by
companies authorized to do business in New Jersey.” (citations omitted)).
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“personal injury protection benefits” under the state’s “no-fault”
insurance system. Yet before the court even introduced the background
facts of the case, the majority reversed the Appellate Division’s holding
229
based on the statute’s “plain language.” Nonetheless, after an
extensive review of the relevant facts and statutory text, the majority
concluded by noting that “[n]othing in the legislative history . . .
230
conflict[ed] with [its] plain reading.”
Additional support for the Rabner Court’s more restrained
interpretive methodology (as compared to that of the Poritz Court) —
including its greater commitment to legislative intent — is evident in its
higher percentage of citations to the New Jersey legislature’s codified
231
canons of statutory interpretation. One of the two codified canons is a
glossary of legal terms that includes definitions for words such as
“affirmation” and “assessor” and is generally only relevant when one of
232
the specific terms is included in a statute. New Jersey Statute, Section
233
1:1-1, however, which the court cites in Bryant, provides a more
general framework for conducting statutory interpretation:
In the construction of the laws and statutes of this state, both civil
and criminal, words and phrases shall be read and construed with
their context, and shall, unless inconsistent with the manifest intent
of the legislature or unless another or different meaning is expressly
indicated, be given their generally accepted meaning, according to
234
the approved usage of the language.

Hardly domineering, the statute can be read to provide the justices
with some breathing room based on its use of the phrase “generally
accepted meaning” and the always-malleable notion of “context.” But
229

Id. at 511 (“We now reverse. Plaintiff is subject to all of the provisions of N.J.S.A.
39:6A-8(a) pursuant to the Deemer Statute. Under the plain language of N.J.S.A. 39:6A8(a), the limitation-on-lawsuit threshold can be invoked only by a defendant who is eligible
to receive New Jersey PIP benefits.”).
230
Id. at 518 (emphasis added) (referencing the Deemer Statute and the related N.J.S.A.
39:6A-8(a)).
231
See generally Scott, supra note 50 (providing the first comprehensive fifty-state
survey of legislatively enacted rules of interpretation). Gluck explains that some of these
laws, such as Connecticut’s “text-focused regime” even stem from “what the legislature
perceived as an inappropriate judicial power grab over interpretive methodology.” See
Gluck, States as Laboratories, supra note 47, at 1756. There is no indication, however, that
the New Jersey legislature passed these laws as a result of controversial state supreme court
decisions.
232
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 1:1-2 (West 2011).
233
See In re Election Law Enforcement Comm’n Advisory Op., 201 N.J. at 263.
234
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 1:1-1 (West 2011).
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the underlying message comes across clearly: the legislature is in
charge, and therefore, the court should not get creative with the text.
Unlike the Poritz Court, which only cited the two codified canons in 2.4
percent of its sample cases, the Rabner Court cited them in 22.2 percent
235
of its sample cases.
VI. LOOKING BACKWARDS AND MOVING FORWARDS
A. Institutional Explanations
In his influential article on the New Jersey Supreme Court, Seton
Hall Law Professor John B. Wefing outlines twelve institutional factors
that have “given the court a willingness and ability to take activist, and
236
independent stands” in its decisions. Wefing is primarily interested in
exploring the court’s independence vis-à-vis the United States Supreme
Court and other state high courts across the nation and does not
specifically address the issue of statutory interpretation. Yet the decline
of two interrelated factors on his list appears to shed light on the court’s
evolving statutory jurisprudence over the past decade: “political support
for the judiciary” and the “moderate position of the Governors of both
237
parties during the last fifty years.” Christine Todd Whitman, a
235
See Appendix. The Rabner Court includes Rows 1-54, inclusive, for a total of fiftyfour cases, and the Poritz Court includes Rows 83-249, inclusive, for a total of 167 cases.
The Rabner Court percentage includes citations in three dissents. The Poritz Court dissents
did not include any citations to either codified canon. The disparity in citations cannot be
attributed to the relative newness of the statute. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 1:1-1 was included
verbatim in the 1937 codification of New Jersey Statutes. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 1:1-1 (West
1937).
236
See Wefing, Fifty Years, supra note 119, at 710.
237
Id. (citations omitted). The rest of the list includes:
[T]he method of appointment of the justices; the unwritten but institutionalized
requirement that the court be balanced between the political parties; the absence
of initiative and referendum; the relative difficulty of constitutional amendment;
the absence of an elected attorney general and elected prosecutors; the limited
docket of the supreme court; the absence for a long time of the death penalty;
the leadership and political clout of the chief justices; the competence,
confidence and long tenure of the justices; and the presence of a public
advocate.
Id. (citations omitted). Although there is no reason to believe that the following systemic
change has impacted the court, it is worth noting that the voters of New Jersey recently
amended its Constitution (2005) and elected the state’s first lieutenant governor (2009). See
N.J. CONST. art. 5, § 1. Like her boss, Lieutenant Governor Kim Guadagno has a strong
prosecutorial background. She has served as a federal prosecutor, assistant attorney general
and deputy director of the Division of Criminal Justice, and sheriff of Monmouth County.
See Lt. Governor Kim Guadagno: Biography, ST. OF N.J.,
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moderate Republican governor who was always viewed as a centrist
238
within the Republican Party, appointed Chief Justice Poritz. Poritz
was also re-nominated by James McGreevey, a Democratic Governor
who styled himself as a “New Democrat” in the vein of President Bill
Clinton. McGreevey’s decision to re-nominate the Republican Poritz
also ensured popular and centrist support within the political community
239
for the Poritz-led judiciary.
The same cannot be said for the rise of Chief Justice Rabner. As
noted above, the Rabner Court has been more attentive to text and
legislative intent and less devoted to the more abstract theory of
purposivism. The Rabner Court’s more systematic approach to
interpreting statutes may stem from the circumstances under which
then-State Attorney General Stuart Rabner became chief justice. All
parties involved expected the Rabner nomination and confirmation
240
process to proceed smoothly, but the New Jersey State Senate had
other plans. Many African-American senators were furious that the
Governor did not give more serious consideration to minority

http://www.state.nj.us/governor/lt/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2011); see also Teja Anderson, Kim
Guadagno-New Jersey’s First Lieutenant Governor, LIVING MEDIA (Monmouth Cnty., N.J.),
Apr.
26,
2010,
http://www.livinginmedia.com/article/kim_guadagno_new_jerseys
_first_lieutenant_governor.html. Upon taking office, Governor Christie also eliminated the
office of the public advocate. See New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate, ST. OF
N.J., http://www.state.nj.us/publicadvocate/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2011) (“On June 29, 2010,
Governor Chris Christie signed P.L. 2010, Chapter 34, which officially abolished the
Department of the Public Advocate and transferred certain functions, powers and duties to
other state Departments.”).
238
See Christine Todd Whitman, Op-Ed., It’s Still My Party, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30,
2009, at A27 (describing her disappointment over Senator Arlen Specter’s decision to
switch from the Republican Party to the Democratic Party and her belief that his decision is
an indication of the dwindling prospects for moderates within the Republican Party). See
generally CHRISTINE TODD WHITMAN, IT’S MY PARTY TOO: THE BATTLE FOR THE HEART OF
THE GOP AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA (2005) (descrying the rightward shift of the
Republican Party and decline in stature of moderate Republican national leaders, such as
Colin Powell, George Pataki, and herself).
239
See David Kocieniewski, Aides Say McGreevey Will Seek Another Term for Chief
Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/27/nyregion/aidessay-mcgreevey-will-seek-another-term-for-chief-justice.html?scp=8&sq=poritz&st=cse.
Only right-wing Republicans angered by her alleged judicial activism and left-wing
Democrats angered over her alleged lack of action on racial profiling during her tenure as
state Attorney General withdrew their support.
240
See Laura Craven, Corzine Names Rabner Next Chief Justice, STAR LEDGER (June 4,
2007,
8:23
PM),
http://blog.nj.com/ledgerupdates/2007/06/corzine_names_rabner
_next_chie.html.
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241

candidates and instead nominated his own chief counsel, who had no
prior judicial experience. State Senator Nia H. Gill, an AfricanAmerican Democrat from Essex County, was even rumored to have
242
invoked “senatorial courtesy” in order to block the nomination.
243
Although Gill denied doing so, Rabner had to meet privately with the
244
State Senator before a confirmation hearing could be scheduled, and
she still refused to vote for his confirmation. Even though Gill was the
245
only senator not to vote for Rabner, she and her colleagues made clear
that they were not in Trenton simply to “rubber-stamp” the governor’s
246
decisions. Thus, Rabner, a Democrat with little experience practicing
247
law in New Jersey state courtrooms, began his tenure with tepid
political support from his own party. Democratic Governor Jon Corzine,
248
meanwhile, who had made Rabner his chief counsel, attorney general,
and then chief justice, was widely considered to be more liberal than the
historically moderate New Jersey pols from both parties. Writing in
Newsweek following Corzine’s 2000 election to the United States
Senate, David Brooks listed him as one of the main reasons the election
shifted the Senate so far to the left, even though Corzine was replacing a
249
fellow Democrat. As governor, he did not veer from his liberal
principles, attempting to tackle controversial social issues, such as
increased funding for stem cell research and legalization of gay
250
marriage — both of which failed. Chief Justice Rabner, therefore, not
241
See Richard G. Jones, Nomination of Chief Justice Raises Questions in Trenton,
N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/14/nyregion/14justice.html.
242
“Senatorial courtesy,” also practiced at the federal level, allows for state senators to
block nominees (usually judges) from their home districts. Stuart Rabner lived in Caldwell,
New Jersey, which is part of Essex County.
243
See Laura Craven, Gill Denies Blocking Rabner, STAR-LEDGER (June 21, 2007, 3:18
PM), http://blog.nj.com/ledgerupdates/2007/06/gill_denies_blocking_rabners_n.html.
244
See id.
245
See Richard G. Jones, After One Objection, Senate Confirms Corzine’s Choice for
Chief Justice, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/22/nyregion/
22confirm.html?adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1274176847-jutJNzm4uLwg+OYk9tngWg.
246
See id.
247
Mr. Rabner worked in New Jersey for years as a federal prosecutor in the U.S.
Attorney’s Office for the District of New Jersey in Newark. He worked his way up to chief
of the criminal division. But as a result, he primarily practiced law in federal court. See
Moroz & Ung, supra note 209.
248
Under the New Jersey Constitution, the State Attorney General is not elected but
rather appointed by the Governor. See N.J. CONST. art. V, § IV, cl. 3.
249
See David Brooks, Letter to the Right: Surviving the Coming Clash, NEWSWEEK,
Dec. 25, 2000, at 61.
250
See David Kocieniewski, Unlucky and Aloof, Corzine Fell Short of Trenton Goals,
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only lacked the traditional political backing of the legislature but also
had to deal with the popular conception that “governors look for people
with generally the same ideological viewpoints when selecting justices
251
for the court.” And this is all on top of the fact that Rabner was
confirmed at the relatively young age of forty-six, meaning that he
252
could potentially serve on the bench for more than two decades.
Poritz, on the other hand, was nominated at fifty-nine and knew that she
253
would need to retire in 2006 on her seventieth birthday. Students of
the court may not be able to discern what has ultimately led Chief
254
Justice Rabner to embrace a more structured approach to statutory
interpretation. But the Rabner Court’s increased citations to a “Modified
Textualism-lite” system of statutory interpretation and reduced
references to a statute’s underlying purpose indicate at least a
subconscious awareness of the changing political winds in New Jersey.
Political support for the judiciary, meanwhile, is rapidly declining
as Governor Chris Christie, arguably the most conservative Republican
ever to capture the governor’s mansion, battles with state Democrats
255
over the future composition of the court. Christie sent a strong
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2009, at A23. In spite of mixed popular support, Governor Corzine did
succeed in achieving his liberal goal of abolishing the death penalty in New Jersey. See Paul
Cox, Corzine Ends Death Penalty in New Jersey, STAR LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Dec. 17,
2007,
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2007/12/nj_death_penalty_is_expected_t.html
(“[V]oters were opposed to ending the death penalty by a margin of 53 percent to 39
percent.”).
251
See Wefing, Fifty Years, supra note 119, at 723.
252
Following nomination and confirmation to a second seven-year term, a sitting justice
can serve with good behavior until reaching the mandatory retirement age of seventy
without needing to be re-nominated.
253
See Brett Pulley, Lawyer at 40 Rises to Chief: Deborah Tobias Poritz, N.Y. TIMES,
June 14, 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/14/nyregion/woman-in-the-news-lawyerat-40-rises-to-chief-deborah-tobias-poritz.html..
254
At a personal level, Rabner’s earlier tenure as a federal prosecutor may at least
contribute to his more rule-based textualism. He was also working as an Assistant United
States Attorney under then-United States Attorney Samuel Alito in Newark, New Jersey.
255
See generally Richard Pérez-Peña, Christie’s Conservatism is not Just Economic,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2011, at A17 (quoting Ben Dworkin, director of the Rebovich Institute
for New Jersey Politics at Rider University, as saying: “‘[Christie] is absolutely the most
conservative governor we have had in the modern history of the state’”). The Philadelphia
Inquirer and the New York Times both published editorials in December decrying the
heightened politicization of the court. See Editorial, Court Battle, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 18,
2010, http://www.philly.com/inquirer/opinion/20101218_Inquirer_Editorial__Court_battle
.html; Editorial, The Politicization of a Respected Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2010, at A38.
More recently, the Wall Street Journal Law Blog published a derisive post on the matter,
mocking New York’s “friends across the Hudson River.” See Ashby Jones, What’s Going
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message to the judiciary by breaking with a half century of precedent
and not re-nominating a supreme court justice following his initial
256
seven-year term. State Democrats were particularly disturbed by this
development since Justice John E. Wallace, Jr. was the lone AfricanAmerican on the court and would have turned seventy in two years, thus
allowing Christie to replace him before the end of his first gubernatorial
term. Democratic Senate President Stephen Sweeney, meanwhile, has
refused to hold a confirmation vote on Christie’s new nominee for
257
Wallace’s seat. Attempting to deal with the impasse, Chief Justice
Stuart Rabner used his state constitutional authority to make a
258
temporary appointment to the bench. Yet the political chess match
transformed into political warfare when Justice Roberto Rivera-Soto, a
conservative Republican, declared that he would abstain from voting in
any future cases since he believed Rabner’s temporary appointment was
259
unconstitutional. Grounding his argument in the scholarly work of
Seton Hall Law Professor Edward A. Hartnett, Rivera-Soto claims that
the New Jersey Constitution only allows for temporary appointments
when necessary for the constitutionally-required quorum of five
on with the New Jersey Supreme Court?, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Jan. 4, 2011, 12:27 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/01/04/whats-going-on-with-the-new-jersey-supreme-court/
(“Take your eyes off of New Jersey for a few days and you’ll almost surely miss a strange
political dustup or two. The latest to play out . . . involves the New Jersey Supreme Court.”).
256
See Voreacos & Dopp, supra note 20 (“Christie’s rejection of Wallace, a Democrat,
upended a bipartisan tradition [in New Jersey] that began after the state’s current
Constitution was adopted in 1947. Since then, no governor has failed to reappoint a justice .
. . even if it meant Democrats appointing Republicans and vice versa.”).
257
See Richard Pérez-Peña , Senate President Vows to Block New Jersey Court
Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2010, at A25. Governor Christie nominated Anne M.
Patterson, a well-respected Republican corporate attorney from Morris County. See Richard
Pérez-Peña , Christie, Shunning Precedent, Drops Justice from Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 4,
2010, at A22.
258
See Peggy Ackerman, New Jersey Supreme Court Justice Quietly Above the Fray,
GLOUCESTER COUNTY TIMES, Oct. 24, 2010, http://www.nj.com/gloucester/index.ssf
?/base/news-6/1287907824123430.xml&coll=8. Justice Rabner selected another Democrat,
intermediate appeals court Judge Edwin H. Stern. Stern, who will turn 70 in June, is not
exempt from the mandatory retirement age. See Matt Friedman & Rohan Mascarenhas, State
Appellate Judge is Appointed Interim N.J. Supreme Court Justice, STAR LEDGER (Newark,
N.J.), Sept. 9, 2010, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2010/09/nj_supreme_court_
appellate_ju.html.
259
See Lisa Fleisher & Chris Herring, Justice Stymies New Jersey High Court, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 11, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870445760457601196
2304920054.html?mod=googlenews_wsj (“A mini-revolt broke out on the New Jersey
Supreme Court Friday when an associate justice said he would abstain from all future
decisions while a temporary justice is serving, leading top Democrats to call for the
associate justice’s resignation.”).
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260

justices. Although the current constitutional crisis overshadows the
debate over the future of the court’s statutory jurisprudence —
especially as the twenty-five-year-old constitutional battle over school
261
funding returns to the court’s docket in early January — the increasing
politicization will undoubtedly influence future statutory decisions,
perhaps pushing the court further along the textualist spectrum.
B. Additional Areas for Research
The relative lack of scholarship exploring the New Jersey Supreme
Court’s method of statutory interpretation leaves ambitious young
scholars with plenty of material to explore. One area in particular relates
directly to the use of legislative history. Practitioners would greatly
benefit from a dissection of the different types of legislative history
used by the court in order to determine if there is any meaningful
262
pattern to the seemingly arbitrary selection of sources.
Not
surprisingly, my research revealed that committee statements are the
263
most relied-upon source of legislative history. Yet there is also a
264
relatively high number of sponsors’ statements
and multiple
260

See Edward A. Hartnett, Ties in the Supreme Court of New Jersey, 32 SETON HALL
L. REV. 735, 768 (2001) (“[A] temporary assignment [to the New Jersey Supreme Court]
should be made only when necessary to make a quorum. . . .”); see also James Ahearn, OpEd., For Top Court Justice, a Defiant Stance, BERGEN REC., Dec. 15, 2010,
http://www.northjersey.com/news/politics/ahearn_121510.html?c=y&page=1 (“[I]n an
unusual attachment to a court decision on an unrelated matter, Rivera-Soto wrote that there
was no need for the Stern appointment because the court could still muster the required
quorum of five justices.”).
261
The New Jersey Supreme Court scheduled the latest round of Abbott oral arguments
for Wednesday, January 5, 2011, when the Education Law Center “is expected to seek
restoration of full state aid in coming years under a formula designed by the Corzine
administration in 2008” and rejected by the Christie administration in 2010. See Rita
Giordano, Center to Fight for ‘Abbott’ Restoration, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 3, 2011,
http://www.philly.com/inquirer/local/20110103_Center_to_fight_for__Abbott__restoration.
html.
262
Although I made sure to record the different forms of legislative history cited in each
case and rank the general degree to which the court relied upon legislative history as a
whole, I did not attempt to discern the relative weight assigned to different forms of
legislative history.
263
See EFG LEGISLATION, supra note 40, at 311 (“Almost half the Supreme Court’s
references to legislative history are to committee reports, and similar documents are the
primary legislative history invoked by state courts as well.”) (citing Jorge Carro & Andrew
Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative Histories: A Statistical Analysis,
22 JURIMETRICS J. 294, 304 (1982)).
264
For a numerical tally, see the two charts listed in the Appendix. The two charts list
twenty citations to sponsors’ statements under the Poritz Court and twelve citations to
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references to gubernatorial signing statements, even though the court
itself has questioned the use of the latter, which are generally criticized
267
as examples of “subsequent legislative history” developed after the
bill has already been passed by the state legislature.
In any future legislative history studies, scholars may also want to
move beyond the state’s highest court. In addition to the New Jersey
Supreme Court, the state judiciary system includes the appellate
268
division and state superior trial courts. The former is comprised of
thirty-five judges who hear appeals in two or three judge panels from
269
the trial courts, tax court, and state administrative agencies. The latter
is divided into four different divisions (Criminal, Civil, General Equity,
and Family) that hear trials depending on the nature of the dispute and
270
the requested relief. The sprawling trial court system may be a bit
unwieldy for systematic scholarly analysis, but the appellate panels
provide a definitive sample size of cases, many of which will inevitably
involve questions of statutory interpretation. Just as Abbe Gluck
discusses the potential for a normative discussion between state and
federal courts grappling with different methods of statutory
interpretation, one can easily imagine a similar conversation transpiring
sponsors’ statements under the Rabner Court, for which there is a much smaller sample size
of cases.
265
See id. (listing ten citations to gubernatorial signing statements under the Poritz
Court and seven citations to gubernatorial signing statements under the Rabner Court).
266
See Owens v. Feigin, 194 N.J. 607, 617 n.3 (2008) (“In the hierarchy of legislative
history, signing statements do not carry the interpretive force afforded to statements from
the Legislature.”) (citations omitted). In Owens, on top of the gubernatorial signing
statement, the court also looked to sponsor and committee statements. When issuing signing
statements, New Jersey governors send out press releases that the court will directly cite.
See, e.g., R.A.C. v. P.J.S., Jr., 192 N.J. 81, 94 (2007); State v. D.A., 191 N.J. 158, 169
(2007) (“Indeed, the press release issued at the bill’s passage explains that the amendment
‘[e]stablishes a new crime for any person who attempts to hinder his own apprehension,
prosecution or conviction by concealing evidence, intimidating witnesses, or by giving false
information to a police officer.’ Press Release, Acting Governor Joseph P. Merlino, Senate
Bill No. 1537 (Sept. 24, 1981).”).
267
See EFG LEGISLATION, supra note 40, at 316.
268
See An Overview of the Court Process, N.J. JUDICIARY, http://www.judiciary
.state.nj.us/nj_overview.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2011). The New Jersey judicial system
also includes local municipal courts and a tax court, which is a court of limited jurisdiction
with twelve judges. See Tax Court of New Jersey, N.J. JUDICIARY, http://www.judiciary
.state.nj.us/taxcourt/index.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
269
See Superior Court, Appellate Division, N.J. JUDICIARY, http://www.judiciary
.state.nj.us/appdiv/index.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
270
See Local Courts in Your County, N.J. JUDICIARY, http://www.judiciary
.state.nj.us/trial.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
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between intermediate state courts and the New Jersey Supreme Court.
Yet the sheer absence of statutory interpretation scholarship at the
intermediate level prevents the supreme court justices from having any
272
sense of evolving trends in the lower courts. The development of
methodological patterns at the lower level may help the justices
formulate their own interpretive approaches. On the other hand, the
justices may want to get a better sense of whether or not their
methodologies, such as the use of the Funnel of Abstraction or shift
towards Modified Textualism-lite, are being followed by their
273
counterparts in the appellate division.
Another related topic is the extent to which the court defers to state
agencies. In a number of opinions, the court made a point of
highlighting the traditional deference owed to an agency’s interpretation
of a statute but did not appear to follow any New Jersey-specific
274
regime. In their comprehensive study of the United State Supreme
Court’s Chevron jurisprudence, William Eskridge and Lauren Baer have
demonstrated that judges may ascribe to their own deference regime in
275
theory but then fail to apply it in practice. Although I noted instances
276
in which the court at least paid lip service to agency interpretations, I
271
See Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 129, at 193 (citations
omitted) (raising the prospect that the courts could “embrace a ‘dialectical federalism’ for
statutory interpretation — a conversation between state and federal courts that could shape
the evolution of interpretive doctrine itself”).
272
For one notable exception, see Judith H. Wizmur, Judge Michael Patrick King:
Judicial Orientation as Reflected by Statutory Construction, 35 RUTGERS L.J. xv (2004)
(analyzing the statutory jurisprudence of Judge Michael Patrick King, who served on the
New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, from 1975-2004).
273
See Gluck, supra note 129, at 193-95 (discussing the potential for cross fertilization
of interpretive methodologies between the state courts and the federal courts).
274
See, e.g., N.J. Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep’t of Agric.,
196 N.J. 366, 385 (2008) (upholding the Department of Agriculture’s regulations regarding
the treatment of veal calves and the transportation of sick or downed animals).
275
See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96
GEO. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008) (finding that Chevron deference “was applied in only 8.3% of
Supreme Court cases evaluating agency statutory interpretations”).
276
See, e.g., In re Election Law Enforcement Comm’n Advisory Op., 201 N.J. 254, 262
(2010) (“Generally, an appellate court should give considerable weight to a state agency’s
interpretation of a statutory scheme that the legislature has entrusted to the agency to
administer. This deference comes from the understanding that a state agency brings
experience and specialized knowledge to its task of administering and regulating a
legislative enactment within its field of expertise. Moreover, regulations promulgated by an
agency in furtherance of a statutory scheme it is charged with enforcing are presumed to be
valid. We will defer to an agency’s interpretation of both a statute and implementing
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did not attempt to measure the degree to which the court actually
277
deferred to them. The question of deference not only applies to this
Article’s narrow focus on legislative history (both function as extrinsic
sources capable of shedding light on the statutory text under review) but
also to the New Jersey Supreme Court as a whole, due to the court’s
reputation for independence. Thus, further study into the relative
influence of different forms of legislative history and state agency
interpretations will help reveal where the court stands on the spectrum
between independent institutional entity and legislative/executive
relational agent. For example, highly deferential acceptance of
executive agency statutory interpretations, coupled with heavy reliance
on gubernatorial signing statements, would indicate a greater awareness
of the executive branch — and its power of appointment. Whereas
minimal reliance on sponsors’ statements, floor colloquies, and rejected
amendment proposals might reveal the court’s greater sense of
278
independence vis-à-vis the state legislature.
At a more meta-level of analysis, this Article also raises the
question of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s future approach to
constitutional interpretation. As discussed in Part VII infra, the court’s
Brennan-esque fame comes from its constitutional law holdings. Yet the
court’s fairly pragmatic approach to statutory interpretation over the
past decade — in which even the more purpose-driven Poritz Court
afforded great weight to statutory text — may call into question the
court’s role in the state’s separation-of-powers balancing act. The
regulation, within the sphere of the agency’s authority, unless the interpretation is ‘plainly
unreasonable.” (citations omitted)).
277
Although uncommon, neither the Rabner Court nor the Poritz Court was afraid to
reject agency interpretations. See, e.g., Reilly v. AAA Mid-Atlantic Ins. Co. of N.J., 194
N.J. 474, 478 (2008) (holding that the Department of Banking and Insurance “applied its
regulations in a manner that exceed[ed] the scope of its statutory authority”); In re
Freshwater Wetlands Prot. Act Rules, 180 N.J. 478, 491 (2004) (holding that the
Department of Environmental Protection exceeded its authority when it adopted rules
regulating the development of residential projects).
278
Any additional research into the uses of legislative history and, more specifically,
into the question of the court’s deference, or lack thereof, to the state legislature, should also
include a more detailed analysis of the state legislative process. If judges claim they are
deferring to legislators, they should make sure they understand the intricacies of the
legislative process, including any deliberate attempts on the part of legislators and their
staffers to leave language ambiguous. Thus, all parties would benefit from a study similar to
that conducted by Victoria Nourse and Jane Schacter at the federal level in which the two
scholars did an empirical study of the Senate Judiciary Committee’s legislative drafting
process. See Victoria Nourse & Jane Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A
Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 576-77 (2002).
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court’s recent decision not to revisit the gay marriage issue, written by
Chief Justice Rabner, may be indicative of a more restrained
279
constitutional role. Only four years earlier, prior to the appointment of
Chief Justice Rabner, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the law
banning same-sex marriage violated the equal protection provisions of
280
the New Jersey Constitution. Yet the court allowed the legislature to
choose between amending the marriage statute to include same-sex
couples or passing a statute allowing for civil unions that conferred on
same-sex couples the same rights, benefits, and obligations of civil
281
marriage. The legislature chose the latter, and four years later, six
282
same-sex couples brought suit. The plaintiffs alleged that they had
been denied the full rights and benefits the court had earlier ruled were
283
guaranteed to them under the New Jersey Constitution. Citing an
insufficient trial record, Chief Justice Rabner wrote the decision
denying the motion for rehearing. Although he did not reject the
application outright, Rabner bought the court time, perhaps hoping the
legislature will intervene before the issue works its way back up to the
court. Rabner supporters may argue that the Chief Justice was faced
with a more monumental decision in that he could not split the
difference as his predecessors did in 2006. Therefore, his denial may not
be indicative of a reduced constitutional role for the court. Yet in
regards to the issue of gay marriage, the year 2006 seems like ancient
279
See Associated Press, New Jersey Supreme Court Declines Gay Marriage Case,
N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2010, at A17 (noting that the court did not outright reject the
application but rather called for the case to first be argued in the trial court); see also Lewis
v. Harris, 202 N.J. 340, 340 (2010) (“This matter cannot be decided without the
development of an appropriate trial-like record. Plaintiffs’ motion is therefore denied
without prejudice to plaintiffs filing an action in Superior Court and seeking to create a
record there. We reach no conclusion on the merits of plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the
constitutionality of the Civil Union Act, N.J.S.A. 37:1-28 to -36.”).
280
See Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415, 422 (2006) (citing N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 1). The
court did note, however, that it could not “find that a right to same-sex marriage is so deeply
rooted in the traditions, history, and conscience of the people of this State that it ranks as a
fundamental right.” Id. at 441.
281
Id. at 423 (“The name to be given to the statutory scheme that provides full rights
and benefits to same-sex couples, whether marriage or some other term, is a matter left to
the democratic process.”).
282
Editorial, N.J.’s Gay Marriage Debate: Back to Court because Lawmakers Failed,
STAR LEDGER (Mar. 24, 2010, 5:26 AM), http://blog.nj.com/njv_editorial_page/2010
/03/nj_gay_marriage_back_to_court.html (discussing the decision by gay rights
organizations to ask the court to “reopen the case” following the bill’s demise in the
legislature).
283
See Lewis v. Harris, 202 N.J. at 340.
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history. Given all that has taken place across the country over the past
284
four years, not to mention the fact that the earlier decision provided
the necessary legal framework for granting marriage equality, Rabner
could have at least allowed for oral arguments. Regardless of the
285
underlying reasoning driving his decision, Rabner exhibited the same
mild restraint in the constitutional realm that his court has demonstrated
in the statutory realm.
C. “Exogenous Shocks”
Systemic studies of the court’s historical use of legislative history
and application of deference will also help determine the degree to
which Christie’s election as governor and subsequent nominations to the
court represent what Harvard Law Professor Adrian Vermeule refers to
286
as “exogenous shocks” to the judicial system. That is not to say that
Christie and his judicial picks are going to have a negligible impact on
the future of the court’s approach to statutory interpretation. But such
factors may only be playing a role, albeit a leading one, in the overall
287
interpretive drama of methodological cycling. Chronicling the
284
Since the court’s 2006 ruling, gay marriage has been legalized in Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Iowa. See Maria Godoy, State by State: The
Legal Battle over Gay Marriage, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, Dec. 15, 2009, http://www.npr.org
/templates/story/story.php?storyId=112448663; see also John Schwartz, Despite Setback,
Gay Rights Move Forward, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2010, at A18 (highlighting the fact that
“two laws restricting gay rights — the federal Defense of Marriage Act and the California
ban on same-sex marriage — have been declared unconstitutional by federal judges in
recent months”); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Signs Away ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 22, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/23/us/politics/23military
.html?scp=4&sq=dont%20ask%20dont%20tell&st=cse (marking the end of the ban on gays
and lesbians serving openly in the military).
285
See Bob Braun, N.J. Supreme Court’s Refusal to Hear Gay Marriage Case Raises
Question of Christie’s Influence, STAR LEDGER (Aug. 16, 2010, 10:35 AM),
http://blog.nj.com/njv_bob_braun/2010/08/nj_supreme_court_justices_who.html (discussing
the possibility that Chief Justice Stuart Rabner and Justices Roberto Rivera-Soto and Helen
Hoens voted against rehearing because they are all subject to reappointment by Governor
Chris Christie, who has openly expressed his opposition to gay marriage); see also Mary
Fuchs, N.J. Gubernatorial Candidates Address Social Issues, Including Medical Marijuana,
Gay Marriage, STAR LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Oct. 8, 2009, http://www.nj.com/news/
index.ssf/2009/10/nj_gubernatorial_candidates_ad_1.html (“I think civil unions are strong
and I think they’re good and I’m a supporter of civil unions and the civil union law in New
Jersey. But I am not a supporter of same-sex marriage.”).
286
See Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory Interpretation, 68 U. CHI. L. REV.
149, 181 (2001).
287
There is clearly a difference between short-term shifts and long-term developments
in interpretive methodology. Exogenous events may appear to have a greater impact on
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evolution of the United States Supreme Court’s treatment of general
288
statutory commands,
Vermeule moves beyond “exogenous
disturbances” to examine the internal behavior of repeat players within
the system. Vermeule provides the example of “judicial recourse” to
legislative history, an interpretive maneuver that may cause elected
officials to manipulate legislative history, leading judges to refrain from
referencing it out of fear that it is corrupted, thereby causing legislators
289
to stop manipulating it, in turn leading judges to reference it again.
Thus, the slight but perceptible shift between the Poritz and Rabner
Courts may just be a natural reflection of “a cyclical pattern of
continuous mutual adjustment,” which “never reaches a stable
290
equilibrium.” The precise crossover influence of the judicial,
legislative, and executive branches is difficult to determine, but the
system’s internal mechanisms may be driving an endless cycle of
interpretive adjustment that cannot just be explained by external
influences, such as gubernatorial elections and judicial nominations.
Although I cannot declare without further study that disequilibrium is
endemic to the court’s approach to statutory interpretation, I can say
that it is something future scholars should take into account in
attempting to assess the court’s methodology — both historically and
during the Christie-era.
VII. NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT JUSTICE WILLIAM
BRENNAN: MODERATE CHAMPION
The New Jersey Supreme Court has the honorable distinction of
being the last state court to send one of its members directly to the
United States Supreme Court. On September 29, 1956, President
Dwight D. Eisenhower nominated New Jersey Supreme Court Associate
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. to fill Justice Sherman Minton’s vacated
short-term shifts, but such events may be an outgrowth of long-term, internal developments.
288
Vermeule’s cyclical example highlights turning points at Church of the Holy Trinity
v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892) (“flexible treatment of general statutory prohibition”);
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917) and Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55
(1930) (“both of which pronounced that clear statutory text is all-but-conclusive evidence of
legislative intent”); United States v. American Trucking Assocs., Inc., 310 U.S. 534 (1940)
(“return to purposive interpretation, saturated by extrinsic sources”); United States v. Locke,
471 U.S. 84 (1985), Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564 (1982); and TVA v.
Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (moving toward a “direction of greater formality in famously
literalist decisions”). Vermeule, supra note 286, at 183-84.
289
Vermeule, supra note 286, at 152.
290
Id.
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291

seat on the United States Supreme Court. Brennan, largely selected
based on his religious and political affiliations, would go on to serve as
one of the United State Supreme Court’s leading liberals in the second
292
half of the twentieth century. In the realm of statutory interpretation,
293
he authored major purpose-driven opinions in cases such as Weber
294
and K Mart. Brennan, who served as an Associate Justice for thirtyfour years, is generally considered to be “the most forceful and effective
295
liberal ever to serve on the [United States Supreme] Court.” Yet
Brennan’s early judicial tenure in New Jersey ⎯ and not his later work
in Washington ⎯ better reflects the current state of the New Jersey
Supreme Court’s statutory jurisprudence.
Brennan’s short and fairly non-ideological tenure on the New
Jersey Supreme Court was marked more by courtroom efficiency than
296
controversial decisions. Chief Justice Vanderbilt primarily admired
297
Brennan for his ability to move cases rapidly through the court system
291

President Names Jersey Democrat to Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1956, at

1.
292

Having already made two Republican appointments during his first term and facing
what appeared at the time to be a strong re-challenge from Adlai Stevenson, Eisenhower
sought to burnish his bipartisan credentials and try to win over Catholic Democrats in
advance of the 1956 presidential election. See KIM ISAAC EISLER, A JUSTICE FOR ALL 89
(1993); SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION 74-75
(2010) (describing the pressure by leading Catholics, including Francis Joseph Cardinal
Spellman, the archbishop of the Catholic Archdiocese of New York, to maintain the
“Catholic seat” that had been lost upon the death of Justice Fran Murphy in 1949); see also
FRANK I. MICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND DEMOCRACY 64 (1999) (describing Justice Brennan’s
democratic liberalism).
293
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979). See ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 26, at 15 (“Justice William Brennan’s opinion for
the Court slighted the original legislative intent and focused instead on the consistency of
voluntary affirmative action with the ‘spirit’ and ‘purpose’ of the statute.” (emphasis
added)).
294
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 295 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring).
See ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 26, at 117 (describing
Brennan’s reasoning, Eskridge writes: “Since Congress’s core purpose in 1922 was to
prevent importers from cheating the American holder out of its bargained-for rights, the
legislators would probably have excepted common control situations had they presented
themselves” (emphasis added)).
295
STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 292, at xiii.
296
On a related note, out of the hundreds of cases Brennan handled as a judge in the
New Jersey judicial system, only three “turned on the resolution of a federal question, and in
all three that question was statutory.” William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 490 (1977) [hereinafter Brennan,
State Constitutions].
297
See EISLER, supra note 292, at 82.
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and generally tapped him to make mundane speeches about New Jersey
298
299
state court reform. Brennan’s activist jurisprudence on the nation’s
highest court, therefore, should not and cannot be viewed as a mere
300
continuation of his work on the state’s highest court. It was not until
long after Brenan had ascended to the United States Supreme Court that
301
he wrote his infamous federalism article in the Harvard Law Review.
The Justice’s focus on state constitutionalism as a means for protecting
individual rights, moreover, is indicative of the distinction that must be
made between the New Jersey Supreme Court’s constitutional
302
jurisprudence and statutory jurisprudence. Regardless of whether the
303
New Jersey Supreme Court merits its activist reputation due to its
creative constitutionalism, the reputation does not fit with the court’s
304
more formulaic statutory opinions. Brennan may have noted an uptick
298

See STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 292, at 66 (noting that Brennan “had become
Vanderbilt’s public relations man, trumpeting New Jersey’s court reforms to audiences
throughout the state and beyond”).
299
As a United States Supreme Court Justice, “Brennan interpreted the Constitution
expansively to broaden rights as well as create new ones for minorities, women, the poor,
and the press . . . . In the process, he came to embody an assertive vision for the courts in
which judges aggressively tackled the nation’s most complicated and divisive social
problems.” STERN & WERMIEL, supra note 292, at xiii.
300
See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Supreme Court Judge Versus United
States Supreme Court Justice: A Change in Function and Perspective, 19 U. FLA. L. REV.
225 (1966) (discussing the different judicial responsibilities of those serving on state
supreme courts, as opposed to on the United States Supreme Court).
301
Brennan, State Constitutions, supra note 296, at 489.
302
See id. at 491 (“But the point I want to stress here is that state courts cannot rest
when they have afforded their citizens the full protections of the federal Constitution. State
constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond
those required by the [United States] Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law.”
(emphasis added)).
303
See Kevin M. Mulcahy, Note, Modeling the Garden: How New Jersey Built the Most
Progressive State Supreme Court and What California Can Learn, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
863, 863 (1999) (focusing on “the New Jersey Supreme Court, which stands as arguably the
most activist, progressive, and, especially in area of individual rights, important state
supreme court” in the nation).
304
For an example of such creative constitutionalism, see Brennan’s discussion of the
New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349 (1975) (expanding
the fourth amendment right against illegal searches through a broad reading of the state
constitution’s analogous provision, which contained nearly identical language to that of the
original Bill of Rights). Brennan, State Constitutions, supra note 296, at 499 (referencing
N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 7) (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue except upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the papers and things to be seized.”); see
also Brennan, supra, at 501 (discussing S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount
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in expansive readings of state constitutions by state supreme courts
eager to counter an increasingly conservative United States Supreme
Court. Yet neither he, nor any other scholar since, has noted a similar
attempt by state supreme court justices to take such a decidedly
305
expansive approach to statutory interpretation.
Brennan’s moderate tenure on the New Jersey Supreme Court also
raises the broader normative question of whether conservative critics of
the court are more interested in decisional outcome or interpretive
methodology. In his characterization of the Poritz Court’s performance
during the first five years of the Chief Justice’s term, Professor Wefing
concludes that she was carrying on the court’s liberal and progressive
306
tradition. Yet Wefing largely bases his definition of the term “liberal”
on general issue-based concerns and results — and not on a particular
307
method of jurisprudence, either in the constitutional or statutory realm.
Although Wefing highlights what he perceived to be the Poritz Court’s
tendency to read the Constitution liberally in order to expand individual
rights, he primarily focuses on the court’s signature issues, such as
308
school funding and affordable housing. Ultimately, Wefing initiates a
broader discussion of what it means to be a progressive court and
whether Governor Christie is more concerned with methodological
consistency or conservative outcomes. Therefore, Christie’s pledge to
overhaul the “activist” court does not inevitably pave a path towards
stricter textualism since the newly constituted conservative court may
not like the statutes passed by the liberal-leaning legislature. Some form
Laurel, 67 N.J. 151 (1975), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975))
(praising the New Jersey Supreme Court’s “now famous Mt. Laurel decision,” not only for
its result but also for its preclusion from review by the United States Supreme Court due to
its grounding in state constitutional law).
305
See Brennan, State Constitutions, supra note 296, at 495 (“Of late, however, more
and more state courts are construing state constitutional counterparts of provisions of the
Bill of Rights as guaranteeing citizens of their states even more protection than the federal
provisions, even those identically phrased.”).
306
See Wefing, Performance, supra note 114, at 771 (“[D]espite the significant change
in membership, the Poritz Court has essentially continued the progressive, independent, and
generally liberal approach of the Wilentz court.”). Chief Justice Robert Wilentz served from
1979 to 1996 and was succeeded by Chief Justice Poritz. See id. at 770.
307
See id. at 771 (“While the word liberal can have many different meanings, for
purposes of this article, it reflects society’s current perception of the emphasis on individual
rights, expansive views of defendant’s rights, opposition to the death penalty, support for a
woman’s right to choose, opposition to all forms of discrimination, broad protection of
freedom of speech, and concern for the less powerful members of society, as represented by
students in poor school districts, consumers, employees, and plaintiffs.” (citations omitted)).
308
Id. at 769-70 (citations omitted).
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of Gluck’s Modified Textualism may actually still reign, with the
methodological battle revolving around the presence or absence of
309
textual ambiguity.
CONCLUSION
310

The Poritz Court was more Dworkinian than its Rabner-led
successor; its greater comfort with a purpose-driven approach is evident
in one of the most controversial decisions authored by Chief Justice
311
312
Poritz. In New Jersey State Democratic Party v. Samson, a bitterly
contested case with national implications, the court had to interpret New
Jersey election law to determine if the State Democratic Party could
replace Senator Robert Torricelli on the ballot following his withdrawal
313
five weeks before the 2002 election. After outlining the basic facts of
the case, Poritz opened the unanimous decision by quoting Chief Justice
Vanderbilt: “Election laws are to be liberally construed so as to

309
In their Yale Law Journal Online response to Gluck’s article, supra note 47, Ethan
Leib and Michael Serota criticize Modified Textualism for merely “replac[ing] the
traditional debate over the most appropriate application of legitimate interpretive techniques
with a new battle over textual ambiguity.” Leib & Serota, supra note 69, at 58.
310
See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 345-46 (1986) (“A community of
principle does not see legislation the way a rulebook community does, as negotiated
compromises that carry no more or deeper meaning than the text of the statute declares; it
treats legislation as flowing from the community’s present commitment to a background
scheme of political morality. The practice of legislative history, of formal declarations of
general institutional purpose and convictions made on behalf of the state itself, expresses
and confirms that attitude.”).
311
Compare Angelo J. Genova & Jennifer Mazawey, In the Election of 2002, The
Voters of New Jersey were the Winners, 27 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 77, 78 (2002) (praising the
decision for “preserve[ing] the integrity of the New Jersey electoral system, including the
fundamental right of voters to exercise the franchise in a meaningful fashion”) with William
E. Baroni, Jr., Administrative Unfeasibility: The Torricelli Replacement Case and the
Creation of a New Election Law Standard, 27 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 53, 72 (2002)
(criticizing the decision for “open[ing] the door to an entirely new area of election law
litigation”).
312
N.J. State Democratic Party v. Samson, 175 N.J. 178, 183 (2002).
313
New Jersey Democratic Senator Robert G. Torricelli withdrew from his reelection
bid due to increasing pressure from state and national Democratic leaders after he was
admonished by the Senate Ethics Committee for “failing to disclose expensive gifts from a
former contributor to whom he repeatedly gave help.” Tim Golden, Ethics Committee Faults
http://www.nytimes.
Torricelli on Gift Violations, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2002,
com/2002/07/31/nyregion/ethics-committee-faults-torricelli-on-gift-violations.html?scp=
7&sq=torricelli&st=cse (“The committee’s action [came] six months after federal
prosecutors ended a lengthy criminal investigation into Mr. Torricelli’s activities without
filing criminal charges.”).
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314

effectuate their purpose.” The Chief Justice then proceeded to cite
another earlier election law decision, in which the court based its
315
decision on the context of the statute, instead of on its text. Only then
did Poritz address the statute’s text, which deals with vacancies that
“occur not later than the 51st day before the general election” and in the
event of such an occurrence allows for the selection of replacements
316
“not later than the 48th day preceding the date of the general election.”
Senator Torricelli, however, withdrew thirty-six days before the
317
election, thereby falling outside of the statutory window. Ultimately
ruling in favor of the Democratic Party, Poritz partially grounded her
reasoning in statutes from other states that explicitly address what
officials should do when such a vacancy arises outside of the statutory
timeline — thus highlighting the absence of a similar mandate in New
318
Jersey’s statute. The Chief Justice explained that when the legislature
“has not explicitly addressed the issue . . . the Court must consider the
319
‘fundamental purpose’ of the enactment . . . .”
Nonetheless, Poritz’s penchant for consulting a wider array of
sources in the face of clear statutory text (or in rare instances,
320
disregarding the text altogether) does not mean that she was
314

N.J. Democratic Party, 175 N.J. at 186 (citing Kilmurray v. Gilfert, 10 N.J. 435, 440
(1952)).
315
Id. at 189 (citing Wene v. Meyner, 13 N.J. 185, 197 (1953) (“A statute is not to be
given an arbitrary construction, according to the strict letter, but rather one that will advance
the sense and meaning fairly deducible from the context.”)).
316
Id. at 191 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:13-20 (West 2002)) (“In the event of a
vacancy, howsoever caused, among candidates nominated at primaries, which vacancy shall
occur not later than the 51st day before the general election . . . a candidate shall be selected
in the following manner: a. (1) In the case of an office to be filled by the voters of the entire
State, the candidate shall be selected by the State committee of the political party wherein
such vacancy occurred . . . . A selection made pursuant to this section shall be made not later
than the 48th day preceding the date of the general election . . . .”).
317
The oral arguments before the New Jersey Supreme Court took place on October 2,
2002 — 34 days before the November 5, 2002 general election. See Genova & Mazawey,
supra note 311, at 78-79.
318
N.J. Democratic Party, 175 N.J. at 193 n.5 (discussing similar statutes in Alabama,
Kansas, Pennsylvania, Michigan and Minnesota).
319
Id. at 194 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Chief Justice Poritz also cited
legislative history, specifically the Assembly Committee Statement to the 1985
amendments. See id. She also added in a footnote: “We observe that the Legislature is
presumed to be aware of judicial construction of its enactments. Our cases repeatedly have
construed the election laws liberally, consonant with their purpose and with practical
considerations related to process.” Id. at 195 n.6 (citation omitted).
320
See, e.g., Smith v. Fireworks by Girone, Inc., 180 N.J. 199 (2004) (ruling in favor of
a child injured by left-over fireworks in spite of admitting that its decision did not fit with
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attempting to usurp the legislative power from the state’s elected
officials. Poritz’s purposivism represented a collaborative vision in
which the court and the legislature were supposed to act as partners.
Three years into his tenure, Chief Justice Rabner has not rejected that
vision but rather modified it, turning the court into more of a junior
partner.

the actual words of the statute). “It is the proper function, indeed the obligation, of the
judiciary to give effect to the obvious purpose of the Legislature, and to that end ‘words
used may be expanded or limited according to the manifest reason and obvious purpose of
the law. The spirit of the legislative direction prevails over the literal sense of the terms.”‘
Id. at 216 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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